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PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: ETHICS, LAW, AND
THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH
LAWRENCE 0. GoSTIN* AND BENJAMIN E. BERKMAN**
Editor's Note
This Article originally was scheduled to appear in Volume 58, Number 3,
of this publication, as part of the Administrative Law Review's 2006
Symposium, Cracks in the System: The Adequacy of the U.S. Healthcare
Regulation in a Global Age. We decided to present this Article in this issue
to allow the authors to work closely with the World Health Organization
and to account for the constantly changing nature of this field of study.
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INTRODUCTION
Highly pathogenic Influenza A (subtype H5N1) (H5N1 or virus) has
captured the close attention of policymakers who regard pandemic
influenza as a national security threat.1 The virus already is endemic in
avian populations in Southeast Asia, with serious outbreaks now in Africa,
Europe, and the Middle East.2 H5N1 has moved steadily to many regions
of the world, surfacing in Europe as far north as Germany, as far west as
France,3 and as far south as the Mediterranean and Adriatic seas.4 The
virus has spread to the Middle East in Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.5
It has emerged in impoverished countries such as Nigeria and transitional
economies such as India.6
Modeling suggests that the virus will eventually affect the entire globe
through a number of transmission mechanisms such as commerce,
migratory birds, and a highly mobile population.7 International trade and
travel will play a major role in the spread of the virus. The majority of the
outbreaks in Southeast Asia have already been attributed to the movement
of poultry and poultry products.8 Frequent travel makes it difficult to
contain a pandemic. However, even if trade and travel were severely
1. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN
60 (2005) [hereinafter HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN], available at
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/HHSPandemiclnfluenzaPlan.pdf, HOMELAND
SECURITY COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 2 (2005) [hereinafter
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
homeland/nspi.pdf.
2. See World Health Organization (WHO), Avian Influenza-Spread of the Virus to





7. See Ira M. Longini et al., Containing Pandemic Influenza at the Source, 309 SCI.
1083, 1083 (2005); H. Chen et al., Establishment of Multiple Sublineages of H5N1 Influenza
Virus in Asia: Implications for Pandemic Control, 103 PROC. OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI.,
2845, 2845 (2006) [hereinafter Implications for Pandemic Control].
8. See Implications for Pandemic Control, supra note 7, at 2845, 2849.
ADMINISTRATIVE LA W REVIEW
restricted, it is possible that migratory birds still would bring the virus to
other continents. 9
At present, the spread of the H5N1 strain is mainly confined to animal
populations. While the virus is highly contagious among birds, ° it is still
rare in humans because of a significant species barrier." Confirmed cases
of human infection have nonetheless been reported. As of May 29, 2006,
224 cases of H5N1 have been reported, with 127 deaths.1 2 Most of these
cases are attributable to close contact with infected poultry, particularly at
poultry farms and markets, cock-fighting venues, or when poultry is used
as backyard pets. 13 While a few cases of human-to-human transmission
have occurred, principally resulting from intimate household contact,
transmission is not common beyond one person. 14 The virus appears to be
highly pathogenic when occurring among humans, with a reported death
rate exceeding 50%. 15 However, because of possible under-reporting, the
prevalence, transmissibility, and fatality of H5N1 remain uncertain.
A series of compounding possibilities make it likely that a new influenza
pandemic could emerge, although the timeframe and virulence are
uncertain. The first five of the following six essential prerequisites for a
pandemic have already occurred: (1) a novel viral subtype is identified in
animal populations such as swine or poultry, (2) the virus spreads to
animals in a wider geographic setting, (3) the virus jumps from animals to
humans inefficiently, (4) the virus more efficiently spreads from animals to
humans, (5) inefficient human-to-human transmission is documented, and
(6) efficient human-to-human transmission emerges. Through adaptive
mutation or viral reassortment, the H5N1 virus could become highly
transmissible among humans, thus leading to a pandemic outbreak. 16
Recent evidence that an avian influenza virus caused the 1918 pandemic
lends credence to the theory that current outbreaks could have pandemic
9. See Dennis Normile, Evidence Points to Migratory Birds in H5N1 Spread, 311 Sci.
1225, 1225 (2006).
10. See Laurie Garrett, Avian Flu Update, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2005, available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050701faessay8440 l/laurie-garrett/the-next-pandemic.html.
11. See The Writing Committee of the World Health Organization Consultation on
Human Influenza A/H5, Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Infection in Humans, 353 NEw ENG. J
MED. 1374, 1379 (2005) [hereinafter Avian Influenza A (H5NJ) Infection in Humans].
12. See WHO, Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza
A/(H5N1) Reported to WHO, May 29, 2006, available at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/
avian influenza/country/casestable_200605_29/en/.
13. See Tran Tinh Hien et al., Avian Influenza A (H5N1) in 10 Patients in Vietnam, 350
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1179, 1181, 1183 (2004).
14. See WHO, Avian Influenza: Significance of Mutations in the H5N1 Virus, Feb. 20,
2006, available at http://www.who.int/csr/2006_02_20/en/index.html.
15. Samson S.Y. Wong & Kwok-yung Yuen, Avian Influenza Virus Infections in
Humans, 129 CHEST 156, 156 (2006).
16. See Robert G. Webster et al., H5N1 Outbreaks and Enzootic Influenza, 12
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 3, 3-4 (2006).
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potential.' 7  Historically, the number of deaths during a pandemic has
varied greatly depending on the number of people who become infected,
the virulence of the virus, and the effectiveness of preventive measures.
8
Such variables lead to great difficulty in establishing accurate predictions
of mortality, and as a result, estimates differ considerably. A mild
pandemic, like the 1957 and 1968 pandemics, is likely to cause the death of
89,000 to 207,000 people in the United States' 9 and 2 million to 7.4 million
people globally.20  Conversely, other studies that extrapolate from the
severe 1918 pandemic indicate that in the absence of intervention, an
influenza pandemic would lead to 1.9 million deaths in the United States
and 180 million to 369 million deaths globally.2 '
Characteristic Moderate (1957/68-like) Severe (1918-like)
Illness 90 million (30%) 90 million (30%)
Outpatient medical care 45 million (50%) 45 million (50%)
Hospitalization 865,000 9,900,000
ICU Care 128,750 1,485,000
Mechanical Ventilation 64,875 742,500
Deaths 209,000 1,903,000
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Health Outcomes:
Number of Episodes of Illness, Healthcare Utilization, and Death Associated
with Moderate and Severe Pandemic Influenza Scenarios
22
17. See, e.g., Jeffrey K. Taubenberger et al., Characterization of the 1918 Influenza
Virus Polymerase Genes, 437 NATURE 889, 889 (2005) (asserting that the 1918 influenza
virus polymerase genes more closely resembled avian-like flu strains than those of a
reassortant virus); Terrence M. Tumpey et al., Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918
Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus, 310 Sci. 77, 79 (2005).
18. See WHO, Avian Flu vs. Pandemic Flu (2005), available at
http://www.wvdhhr.org/healthprep/common/avian-vs-pandemic-flu.pdf.
19. See Laurie Garrett, The Next Pandemic?, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2005, available
at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050701faessay84401/laurie-garrett/the-next-pandemic.html
(describing the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) prediction of the
impact of a "medium-level epidemic"); U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FLU PANDEMIC
MORBIDITY/MORTALITY, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/hsc-scen-
3_flu-pandemic-deaths.htm [hereinafter FLU PANDEMIC MORBIDITY/MORTALITY] (last
visited Feb. 1, 2007).
20. See WHO, AVIAN INFLUENZA: ASSESSING THE PANDEMIC THREAT, (2005)
[hereinafter AVIAN INFLUENZA: ASSESSING THE PANDEMIC THREAT]; World Health
Organization, supra note 18.
21. See, e.g., FLU PANDEMIC MORBIDITY/MORTALITY, supra note 19 (discussing studies
performed by the Departments of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services);
Michael T. Osterholm, Preparing for the Next Pandemic, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 24, 26 (2005).
Notably, seasonal (interpandemic) influenza causes worldwide yearly epidemics resulting in
I to 1.5 million infections. Id.
22. Estimates are based on extrapolation from past epidemics in the United States and
can be found in the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan. For the original table, along with other
information regarding HHS's planning assumptions, see HHS, Pandemic Planning
Assumptions, http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/pandplan.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2007).
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An influenza pandemic would also result in massive economic
disruption. So far, the virus's global economic impact has been fairly
limited. The rural areas of Southeast Asian countries currently are
experiencing the principal economic effects, which relate mostly to the
losses of poultry and to governmental control measures such as the culling
of birds. In Asia, the total direct economic costs due to the H5N1 outbreak
amount to $10 billion.2 3 Small and medium-sized farmers, who often have
no alternative sources of income, have felt the impact the H5Nl outbreak
most acutely. Further, the H5NI outbreak has severely affected trade in
poultry at the domestic, regional, and international level because many
countries prohibit the importation of poultry meat from affected regions.
Since great uncertainties exist about the timing, virulence, and general
scope of a future human influenza pandemic, any estimate of the economic
impact is merely suggestive. On a global scale-extrapolating from the
economic disruptions associated with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS)-a 2% loss of global gross domestic product (GDP) ($800 billion)
can be expected.24 If the outbreak were more severe, it could result in a
global GDP loss of 6% or $3.2 trillion.25 Within the United States, a severe
pandemic would lower the U.S. GDP by as much as 5%, and a milder
pandemic might reduce the U.S. GDP by about 1.5%.26 In addition to these
direct costs, a global flu pandemic would implicate a considerable loss of
global work output. 27 Commerce would sharply decline as people avoid
public spaces. The labor supply would shrink as workers become ill or stay
home to care for others. The lack of an active workforce would place at
risk essential goods and services such as food and water, electricity and
gas, and transportation systems.
23. See WORLD BANK, Report by Global Program for Avian Influenza and Human
Pandemic, in ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AVIAN FLU, available at http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/EXTEAPREGTOPHEAN
UT/0,,contentMDK:20713527-pagePK:34004173-piPK:34003707-theSitePK:503048,00.h
tml (last visited Feb. 1, 2007); UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC & SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR ASIA
AND THE PACIFIC, An Effective Regional Response to the Threat of a Pandemic, in 2 SOCIO-
ECONOMIC POLICY BRIEF 1 (2005), available at http://www.unescap.org/esid/hds/avianflu/
policy-brief-n I -Oct2005.pdf
24. See THE WORLD BANK EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION, SPREAD OF AVIAN FLU
COULD AFFECT NEXT YEAR'S ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPHALFYEARLYUPDATE/Resources/EAP-
Brief-avian-flu.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
25. See SHERRY COOPER, THE AVIAN FLU CRISIS: AN ECONOMIC UPDATE, available at
http://www.bmonesbittburns.com/economics/reports/20060313/report.pdf (last visited Feb.
1,2007).
26. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, A POTENTIAL INFLUENZA PANDEMIC: AN
UPDATE ON POSSIBLE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY ISSUES (2006), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/72xx/doc7214/05-22-Avian%20Flu.pdf [hereinafter A
POTENTIAL INFLUENZA PANDEMIC] (summarizing the United States government's
preparations for an avian flu pandemic).
27. See THE WORLD BANK EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION, supra note 24.
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Further, therapeutic countermeasures (e.g., vaccines and antiviral
medications) and public health interventions (e.g., infection control, social
separation, and quarantine) form the two principal strategies for prevention
and response. Many of the barriers to effective interventions are technical
and have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere. 28 This Article focuses on
the formidable legal and ethical challenges that have yet to receive
sufficient attention.2 9 Part II examines the major medical countermeasures
under consideration as an intervention for an influenza pandemic. This
Part evaluates the known effectiveness of these interventions and analyzes
the ethical claims relating to distributive justice in the allocation of scarce
resources. Part III discusses public health interventions, exploring the hard
tradeoffs between population health on the one hand, and personal (e.g.,
autonomy, privacy, and liberty) and economic (e.g., trade, tourism, and
business) interests on the other. This Part focuses on the ethical and human
rights issues inherent in population-based interventions. Pandemics can be
deeply socially divisive, and the political response to these issues not only
impacts public health preparedness, but also reflects profoundly on the kind
of society we aspire to be.
I. MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES:
VACCINES AND NEURAMINIDASE INHIBITORS
A. General Considerations
Industrialized countries place great emphasis on scientific solutions.
Vaccination and, to a lesser extent, antiviral medication (neuraminidase
inhibitors: oseltamivir (Tamiflu®) or zanamivir (Relenza®)), are perhaps
the most important medical interventions for reducing morbidity and
mortality associated with influenza.3 ° In the $6.7 billion Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) influenza plan, $4.7 billion is allocated
28. See World Health Organization Writing Group, Nonpharmaceutical Interventions
for Pandemic Influenza, International Measures, EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 81, 81
(2006) [hereinafter Nonpharmaceutical Interventions for Pandemic Influenza] (noting that
difficulties in influenza control include "peak infectivity" early in illness and short intervals
between cases, among other factors).
29. See, e.g., Jaro Kotalik, Preparing for an Influenza Pandemic: Ethical Issues, 19
BIOETHICS 422, 424 (2005). For an example of this lack of attention to law and ethics, see
HHS, MEDICAL OFFICES AND CLINICS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLANNING CHECKLIST (2006),
available at http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/medical.html#3. This document purports to
be a "checklist to help medical offices and ambulatory clinics assess and improve their
preparedness for responding to pandemic influenza." Id. However, it does not address the
myriad legal and ethical issues that will arise.
30. See Timothy C. Germann et al., Mitigation Strategies for Pandemic Influenza in the
United States, 103 PROC. OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI. 5935, 5935 (2006); Anthony B. Iton,
Rationing Influenza Vaccine: Legal Strategies and Considerations for Local Health
Officials, 12 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. PRAC. 349 (2006); Klaus St6hr & Marja Esveld, Will
Vaccines be Available for the Next Influenza Pandemic?, 306 SCI. 2195, 2195 (2004).
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for cell-based vaccine technology and stockpiling experimental vaccine,
and $1.4 billion for antiviral medicines. 1 Congress recently appropriated
$3.8 billion to address pandemic influenza.32 While Congress appropriated
less money than HHS requested, Congress preserved the focus on medical
countermeasures. The overwhelming majority of this money is to be spent
on the development and purchase of vaccines and antivirals.
33
Internationally, countries have followed suit, devoting the majority of
their resources towards medical countermeasures. For example, Russia is
planning to have an antiviral stockpile sufficient to cover their entire
population.34 Other countries have set less ambitious coverage goals (such
as Belgium-30%, Germany-20%, Italy-1 0%) 35 but still will be forced
to allocate large amounts for antivirals. Most industrialized countries also
are investing significant sums for vaccine development and stockpiles.36
Despite the promise of medical countermeasures, there is a chronic
mismatch of public health needs and private control of production.
Vaccine production has been unreliable even for seasonal influenza, which
is the leading cause of vaccine-preventable mortality; only a fraction of the
recommended population is vaccinated each year.37 For example, the
United States lost half of its seasonal influenza vaccine supply in 2004-
2005 when the United Kingdom withdrew Chiron Corporation's license
because of bacterial contamination.38
The best way to ensure pandemic preparedness is to increase the baseline
for seasonal countermeasures. The World Health Organization (WHO)
asserted that better use of vaccines for seasonal epidemics would help to
ensure that manufacturing capacity meets demand in a future pandemic.
39
Even though this approach is a good long-term solution, more immediate
31. See A POTENTIAL INFLUENZA PANDEMIC, supra note 26; Stephen Spotswod, HHS
Flu Plan Aims to Lift Vaccine Supply, U.S. MED. (2005), available at
http://www.usmedicine.com/article.cfm?articleID= 1210&issueID=82.
32. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of
Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2782-87
(2005); see also A POTENTIAL INFLUENZA PANDEMIC, supra note 26.
33. HHS, Pandemic Planning Update, Mar. 13, 2006, at 2.




37. Scott A. Harper et al., Prevention and Control of Influenza: Recommendations of
the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, 54 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 1, 2-3 (2005); Kathleen M. Neuzil & Marie R. Griffin, Vaccine Safety-Achieving the
Proper Balance, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2763, 2763 (2005).
38. SUSAN THAUL, VACCINE POLICY ISSUES: CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
REPORT FOR CONGRESS 7 (2005) [hereinafter CRS REPORT].
39. See WHO, World Health Assembly, STRENGTHENING PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE 5 (2005), available at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/
influenza/A58_ 13-en.pdf.
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solutions are needed.4 ° Moreover, supply is difficult to increase because of
the lack of market incentives, intellectual property concerns, regulatory
hurdles, and liability fears, as discussed below.
Despite these concerns, the global distribution of influenza vaccines is
increasing rapidly, but questions remain about global distributive justice.
In 2003, over 291 million doses were distributed globally.4I This is almost
forty million doses more than in 2001.42 Unfortunately, only 35% of all
doses reach the developing countries. Moreover, 85% of the world's
supply of influenza vaccine is produced by companies located in eight
industrialized countries: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and Australia.43
Consequently, 40% of the doses used in central and eastern Europe, 60% of
the doses used in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia, and almost 100%
of the doses used in Latin America, the eastern Mediterranean, and Africa
are imported from one or more of the vaccine-producing developed
countries.44 It is quite likely that in the face of a new pandemic,
governments will not export any of their nationally produced vaccines until
domestic demand is satisfied.45 For example, to ensure coverage for
approximately half of its population, Canadian health officials have
negotiated a contract with their domestic producer to provide five million
doses of influenza vaccine.46 Health officials in other countries have tried
to reach similar agreements without success. 47  Further complicating
matters is recent evidence that H5N 1 floods the bloodstream with the virus,
further calling into question the effectiveness of antivirals and vaccines.48
Moreover, the U.S. government has become too focused on specific
pathogens, disproportionately devoting resources towards developing
medical countermeasures for the disease of the moment. Whether the
threat is anthrax, smallpox, bioterrorism, or influenza, the government
targets the immediately salient threat rather than strengthening the public
health infrastructure so that it can recognize and respond to a range of risks.
40. See id.
41. See WHO, Global Distribution of Influenza Vaccines, 2000-2003, 40 WKLY.
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL REc. 79, 357, 366 (2004), available at http://www.who.int/wer/2004/en/
wer7940.pdf.
42. See id.
43. See David S. Fedson, Pandemic Influenza and the Global Vaccine Supply, 36
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1552, 1553 (2003), available at
http://www.joumals.uchicago.edu/CID/joumal/issues/v36nl 2/20633/20633.web.pdf.
44. See id. See generally JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA: THE EPIC STORY OF
THE DEADLIEST PLAGUE IN HISTORY (2004).
45. See BARRY, supra note 44; Stbhr & Esveld, supra note 30, at 2196.
46. See Fedson, supra note 43, at 1154-55.
47. See id. at 1555.
48. See G. F. Rimmelzwaan et al., Pathogenesis of Influenza A (H5NI) Virus Infection
in a Primate Model, 75 J. VIROL. 6687, 6688-89 (2001).
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States would bear a high proportion of these costs. 49 This "one bug, one
drug" mentality is ineffective because it is impossible to predict and
prepare for the wide variety of threats that society could face.50
Developing medical countermeasure technologies and public health
interventions that could respond to a wide range of emerging biological
threats would be a better use of resources.
B. Planning and Market Incentives
The nation's goal must be to build a system that will ensure a stable,
economically viable supply of vaccines capable of meeting potentially
massive public needs in a just manner. Public and private strategies rather
than private markets are most likely to succeed because of the unique risks
and constraints of vaccine production.5' Private market forces create suffer
failures such as high investment costs, limited or variable markets, and
regulatory non-compliance, each of which inhibits vaccine development.
As vaccine manufacturers leave the industry, they create a risk of severe
shortages. In 1967, twenty-six companies were licensed to distribute
vaccines in the U.S. market, but less than half of this number are licensed
today.52 Only four companies currently supply influenza vaccines, with
only two manufacturing domestically-MedImmune (live attenuated
influenza virus, intranasal (FluMist®)) and Sanofi Pasteur.53
The Institute of Medicine recommends a National Vaccine Authority
(NVA) to advance the development, production, and procurement of
vaccines.54 With or without an NVA, the government can create incentives
by boosting demand through seasonal vaccine awareness programs, issuing
purchasing contracts, and providing price guarantees or subsidies.
Recognizing the need to increase output and availability, the G7 Finance
Ministers recently announced a pilot Advance Market Commitment for
vaccines of public health importance.55
49. See, e.g., HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN, supra note 1, at 6 (illuminating some of
the responsibilities that states and local planners might face, including: distributing
information, planning for vaccine distribution, and implementing immunization registries).
50. Kendall Hoyt, Bird Flu Won't Wait, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2006, at A23.
51. See WHO, VACCINES FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 10 (2004) [hereinafter VACCINES
FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA].
52. See Patricia M. Danzon et al., Vaccine Supply: A Cross-National Perspective, 24
HEALTH AFF. 706, 706 (2005).
53. See David Brown, How U.S. Got Down to Two Makers of Flu Vaccine, WASH.
POST, Oct. 17, 2004, at AO1.
54. See COUNCIL OF THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, APPENDIX 1: STATEMENT ON VACCINE
DEVELOPMENT 262 (2001).
55. CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV., GLOBAL HEALTH POLICY: G-7 TO PILOT ADVANCE MARKET
COMMITMENTS 1 (2005), available at http://blogs.cgdev.org/vaccine/archive/2005/12/.
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Even if vaccination supplies adequately meet mass needs, the
distribution of the vaccines to the population remains problematic. Each
year, drug companies produce millions of influenza vaccines but never
distribute them.56 Pandemic influenza would require mass vaccination in a
short window of time, probably within months of the advent of an
outbreak. Federal stockpiles must meet needs at the local level, requiring
systems for transportation, storage, and safe administration of the vaccine.
If two doses are required to achieve immunity, health service providers
may need a call-back system or immunization registry. At present, the
federal strategic plan fails to resolve these vital issues, instead delegating
them to the states.57
C. Sound Regulation
The vaccine industry must overcome rigorous regulatory hurdles to
achieve safety and efficacy while avoiding increased costs and delays. To
start, vaccines contain living organisms, making the threat of contamination
greater than with drugs. Therefore, vaccines must adhere to higher purity
standards than pills because they often are administered by injection.58
Accordingly, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) plays an active role
during the development of the vaccine, as well as in its licensing. 59 Before
licensure, the FDA reviews the data from clinical trials to assess the
product's safety and effectiveness. 60 After licensure, the FDA conducts
regular manufacturing practice inspections to ensure that the manufacturing
facility produces a consistent product.6 1  Violations found during these
inspections can result in the loss of a manufacturing license; companies
must go through a lengthy reapplication process before the FDA allows
them to continue producing vaccines for public consumption. Additionally,
the FDA requires manufacturers to test each lot of vaccine for contaminants
before public release.62
56. See HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN, supra note 1, at 24 (citing the need for the
availability of at least 81 million treatments, which is enough for about 25% of the U.S.
population).
57. See id. at 7 (declaring that states and communities should have their own plans in
case of an outbreak); see also NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA, supra note 1,
at 24 (positing that one pandemic response action would be to administer the vaccine
according to state and local distribution plans).
58. CRS REPORT, supra note 38, at 1.
59. See id. at 11-14 (presenting some of the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA)
review methods, including fast-track drug development and accelerated approval).
60. Id. at 14.
61. See id. at 7 (describing the FDA's emphasis on the safety and effectiveness of the
vaccines).
62. See id. at 2-3 (stating that each lot is evaluated based on its purity and potency).
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Departing from these onerous regulations, the FDA amended its drug
and biological product policies in 2002 in response to the possibility of a
serious and immediate health threat.63 Under the so-called "Animal Rule,"
the FDA may approve drugs and biological products for marketing based
on animal studies when human studies are unethical or infeasible.64 The
revamped procedure streamlines the process for quickly developing
medical countermeasures in the face of a bioterrorism attack or pandemic
outbreak.65 While this may be an effective regulatory strategy, critics are
concerned that the relaxed requirements could put large numbers of human
lives at risk66 because animal models often do not accurately predict human
responses to drugs or biological products.67 Using multiple species testing
can mitigate, but not entirely remove, this concern.68 Thus, the first human
users essentially will be involved in a clinical trial. While an immediate
threat may justify the need for a streamlined approval process, more public
education is required, and care must be taken to avoid abusing the process.
In addition to the federal regulatory regime, states also regulate vaccines.
For instance, three states, California, 69 Iowa,70 and New York,7 1 regulate
thimerosal-containing vaccines, while bills are pending in other states.
Because influenza vaccines contain thimerosal, this legislation could
undermine federal plans. In addition to federal and state regulation,
agencies in other countries regulate vaccines. Therefore, industry faces
multiple, overlapping regulatory requirements, which must be reconciled.
Recognizing that this problem of overlapping regulatory requirements is
an issue nationally and internationally, the FDA and the European
Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA) recently published "regulatory
pathways for licensing of pandemic vaccines. ' 72 Since manufacturers must
63. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.600-314.650, 601.91 (2005).
64. See id. § 314.610 (showing that the animal tests must prove that the drug product is
"reasonably likely" to benefit humans).
65. See id.
66. Andrew Pollack & William J. Broad, Anti-Terror Drugs Get Test Shortcut, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2002, at Al.
67. Kathi E. Hanna, Extraordinary Measures for Countermeasures to Terrorism:
FDA's "Animal Rule," 32 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 9, 9 (2002).
68. Id.
69. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124172 (West 2006).
70. IOWA CODE ANN. § 135.39B (2006).
71. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2 (McKinney 2005) (prohibiting women who know
they are pregnant from being vaccinated with an influenza faccine that contains more than
1.25 micrograms of mercury per 0.50 milliliter dose, provided that the Commissioner of
Public Health makes a yearly determination that an adequate supply of such low mercury
vaccines exists). This provision goes into effect in 2008. Id. § 3.
72. See VACCINES FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA, supra note 51, at 13 (stating that this
gives companies a more predictable environment for developing and producing the vaccine).
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be licensed and begin commercial production in advance of, or soon after,
the start of a pandemic, regulatory requirements should be timely, efficient,
and well-coordinated.
D. Scientific Information and Intellectual Property
The rapid global dissemination of scientific information will be
necessary to effectively respond to a pandemic outbreak. Such
dissemination would require the speedy collection and sharing of data
involving surveillance and scientific discovery. For example, comparing
sequence data from each isolated case allows scientists to better understand
and track the movement and evolution of the virus.73  However, sharing
information about H5N1 has been problematic. Scientists do not want to
release their data until they have received published credit. 74 Similarly,
many countries want to keep information confidential to protect national
security and intellectual property (IP) interests. Therefore, international
coordination is necessary to facilitate research. Such coordination should
include exchanging study results to avoid duplication, 75 defining
expectations and regulations to avoid conflicts in export and import, and
supporting standardization to avoid quality divergence in industrialized and
developing countries.7 6 In an attempt to encourage collaboration, the WHO
has maintained a restricted database, accessible by only a handful of
laboratories. 77  Recently, this system has been criticized for being
unnecessarily secretive. 78 Rather than allowing broad-based access to the
data that would facilitate scientific research, the WHO has denied access to
many groups.
It is equally important to share manufacturing and technical information.
Potential patent disputes should be anticipated in advance because they
have significant cost implications for commercial vaccines. The H5N1
virus is most effectively grown in fertilized chicken eggs with modification
through reverse genetics. 79  However, this is a patented technology.
80
73. Martin Enserink, As H5N1 Keeps Spreading, A Call to Release More Data, 311 ScI.
1224, 1224 (2006).
74. See id. (quoting an Italian scientist who says, "[i]f publishing one more paper
becomes more important, we have our priorities messed up").
75. St6hr & Esveld, supra note 30, at 2196.
76. JULIE MILSTIEN ET AL., DIVERGENCE OF VACCINE PRODUCT LINES IN INDUSTRIALIZED
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, http://www.who.int/immunization-supply/
divergence vaccines.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
77. See Secret Avian Flu Archive, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2006, at A26 (noting that
restrictions might encourage otherwise reluctant scientists to share their findings on a
limited basis prior to publication).
78. See id. (mentioning an Italian scientist who has refused to reveal her data to the
WHO's secret database that holds the genetic information of the virus).
79. Emily Singer, Pandemic Fears Hatch New Methods in Flu Vaccine Industry, 1I
NATURE MED. 4, 4 (2005), available at http://www.nature.com/nm/journal/vll/nl/full!
nm0105-4a.html.
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Newer cell-based technologies, which promise more efficient mass
production, are also subject to IP protection.8' Although IP affords
incentives for innovation, it can also impede rapid and large-scale vaccine
production in a public health emergency.
The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement
(TRIPS) allows countries to grant compulsory licenses to ensure access to
essential medicines in a public health emergency.82 Compulsory licenses,
which afford the right to produce a product without the patent holder's
authorization, are usually discussed in the context of life-saving
medications for resource-poor countries; however, some have considered
compulsory licenses to ensure adequate Tamiflu production.83 Hoffmann-
La Roche Inc., the patent-holder until 2016, stated that the global demand
is well in excess of production capacity. 84 It will take ten years of constant
production for the company to produce enough of the drug to treat twenty
percent of the world's population. However, the company opposes
compulsory licensing, citing the scarcity of raw materials, the complex
manufacturing process, and the necessity of patent protection to create
incentives.
85
Whatever the merits of compulsory licensing, antivirals will have only
limited utility in a pandemic. Gaining access to Tamiflu on time would
entail visiting a physician or pharmacist. Because influenza is maximally
infectious early in the course of the disease, doctor or pharmacy visits
would seriously risk transmission to the public. Moreover, antiviral
medications remain only partially effective against H5N1 and may not be
effective against a human strain of the virus.86 The potential for mass use
and patient noncompliance within the five-day course of treatment pose a
risk of drug resistance.87 Consequently, reliance on stockpiling antivirals,
although probably helpful in reducing hospitalizations, will not
significantly impede a pandemic.
80. Erika Check, WHO Calls for Vaccine Boost to Prepare for Flu Pandemic, 432
NATURE 261, 261 (2004).
81. Id. (noting that one company holding a patent on technology might accelerate the
process of vaccine selection).
82. Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder, Part 1I, § 5, art. 31,
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/27-trips_04ce.htm.
83. Keith Bradsher, Pressure Rises on Producer of a Flu Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,
2005, at C 1.
84. See id. (clarifying that Tamiflu would have to produce at its full capacity).
85. Id.
86. Frederick G. Hayden, Perspectives on Antiviral Use During Pandemic Influenza,
356 BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1877, 1877-81 (2001).
87. See id. at 1880 (explaining the possibility of a loss of the drugs' efficacy, even for
those treated over shorter periods of time).
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E. Liability and Compensation
Tort liability for the pharmaceutical industry and fair compensation for
patients offers a sound dual approach to vaccine policies. The Public
Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act, enacted in December
2005, makes manufacturers immune from liability under federal and state
law with respect to all claims resulting from the use of medical
countermeasures during a pandemic influenza.8 The liability protections
only apply to products administered or used during the effective period of
the declaration of a public health emergency issued by the Secretary of
HHS.8 9
The PREP Act also authorizes the Secretary to develop a compensation
program for injured individuals. Such a system already exists in the
national Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP), but it needs
reform. The VICP created a no-fault system that pays for injuries caused
by specific immunizations9" and Congress added influenza to VICP in
2005.91 The Federal Claims Court adjudicates compensation based on a
Vaccine Injury Table. To recover, claimants must show that a listed
vaccine caused their injury. Compensation comes from a Compensation
Trust Fund financed by a tax levied on each administered dose.92
Patients can opt-out of VICP, causing a sustained critique that legal
liability represents a major disincentive for the industry. The President's
influenza plan virtually bans all lawsuits except for willful misconduct and
assigns liability determinations to a political figure-the HHS Secretary.93
The political critique, however, overstates the negative influence of liability
on vaccine production. Influenza vaccine litigation remains rare, with only
ten reported cases during the past twenty years, most of which culminated
in small-scale settlements.9 4
88. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of
Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2818
(2006); see also A POTENTIAL INFLUENZA PANDEMIC, supra note 26, at 12.
89. Id.
90. See HHS, HEALTH RES. AND SERVS. ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY
COMPENSATION PROGRAM: FACT SHEET (2006), available at http://www.hrsa.gov/
vaccinecompensation/factsheet.html.
91. Id.
92. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4131, 9510 (2000).
93. See The HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Government Reform, 109th Cong. 9 (2005) (statement of Michael Leavitt, Secretary, HHS)
(setting out the guidelines for liability protections); see also HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
PLAN, supra note 1, at 33 (considering the effects of the protections on vaccine
manufacturers, distributors, and healthcare providers).
94. See Michelle M. Mello & Troyan A. Brennan, Legal Concerns and the Influenza
Vaccine Shortage, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1817, 1818-19 (2005) (charting the results of
lawsuits against influenza vaccine manufacturers, most of which resulted in summary
judgment in favor of the defendants).
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Also, mass usage of an untried vaccine during a public health emergency
could result in numerous adverse events. For instance, health care workers
and patients might be less likely to volunteer without a fair compensation
system, as the failed smallpox vaccination campaign demonstrated.95 On
the other hand, a no-fault system, like VICP, would provide relief for
injured patients and greater certainty for industry. Experimental H5N1
vaccines currently are not covered under VICP, so the new vaccine would
need to be added. Moreover, VICP has become adversarial, burdensome
on claimants, and time consuming. 96 A reformed system must account for
important issues, such as an overwhelmed program resulting in delays,
insufficient money in the compensation trust fund, and injustices caused by
excessive burdens placed on patients injured by a new vaccine. In return,
the industry should be spared strict liability lawsuits, while remaining liable
for recklessness or gross negligence.
F. Ethical Allocation of Scarce Resources
Considerable scientific uncertainty remains in predicting an influenza
pandemic. Moreover, it is certain that there will be extreme scarcity of
medical countermeasures in the short-term. Although H5N1 vaccines are
in clinical trials, 97 companies cannot meet mass needs without dramatic
improvements in production facilities and technologies (e.g., cell-based
cultures and dose sparing).98 Estimates suggest that the current combined
global manufacturing capacity is only capable of making vaccines for 450
million people.99 This is an optimistic estimate because it assumes low-
dose vaccination, even though this dose might not be fully effective. 00
Given international trade law, which affords a single company exclusive
manufacturing rights, along with complex production processes, the same
scarcity might occur with antivirals. The United States, for example, has
limited capacity, with only two domestic vaccine suppliers and no priority
over purchasing orders for Tamiflu. 10 1
95. See INST. OF MED., THE SMALLPOX VACCINATION PROGRAM: PUBLIC HEALTH IN AN
AGE OF TERRORISM 68 (Alina Baciu et al. eds., 2005).
96. See Myron Levin, Vaccine Injury Claims Face Grueling Fight, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
29, 2004, at Al (noting that a young girl became mentally retarded, physically handicapped,
and legally blind after a routine vaccination).
97. See NAT'L INSTS. OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE, NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH,
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: H5NI AVIAN FLU VACCINE TRIALS (2006), available at
http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/news/QA/H5N I QandA.htm (stating that the National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Disease began their first clinical trial in April 2005).
98. Singer, supra note 79, at 4.
99. See David. S. Fedson, Preparing for Pandemic Vaccination: An International
Policy Agenda for Vaccine Development, 26 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 4, 12 (2005) (discussing
the possibility that people will require two doses of the vaccine because most people will
never have been infected with an influenza virus).
100. Meredith Wadman, Race is On for Flu Vaccine, 438 NATURE 23, 23 (2005).
101. Gardiner Harris, U.S. Stockpiles Antiviral Drugs, but Democrats Call Pace Too
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The most challenging question facing bioethics is how to ration scarce,
life-saving resources: "Who shall live when not all can live?"' 0 2 "Blind
justice" might dictate a random allocation of scarce interventions, such as a
lottery or a first-come, first-served system. Yet, this procedure seems
unsatisfying when life-saving countermeasures can be targeted more cost
effectively. American society has accepted "need" as the singular principle
for allocation of seasonal (interpandemic) influenza vaccine-e.g., the
elderly and health care workers.'0 3 Given the devastating social, economic,
and political ramifications of a serious pandemic, the following rationing
criteria are worth consideration.
1. Prevention/Public Health
As the historic mission of public health is prevention, countermeasures
to impede transmission should be a high priority. Thus, where feasible,
rapid deployment of vaccines or prophylaxis to groups at risk of acquiring
infection should be used to contain localized outbreaks. For example, ring
vaccination of direct contacts in a family, congregate setting, or local
community could be an effective intervention that would maximize lives
saved.
2. Scientific/Medical Functioning
If the first political priority is public health, then it is essential to protect
individuals who innovate and produce vaccines or antivirals, provide
treatment, and protect the public's health. These are critical social missions
necessary to save lives and provide care for the sick. Consequently,
priority should be given to key personnel in developing countermeasures,
delivering health care, and devising public health strategies.
3. Social Functioning/Critical Infrastructure
A large-scale pandemic could result in key sectors of society being
unable to function. Many actors and elements are necessary for the
public's health and safety: first-responders, security, essential product and
Slow, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006, at A2 1.
102. John D. Arras, Ethical Issues in the Distribution of Influenza Vaccines, YALE J.
BIOLOGY & MED. (forthcoming 2006).
103. HHS, HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN, APPENDIX D: NVAC/ACIP
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRIORITIZATION OF PANDEMIC INFLUENZA VACCINE AND NVAC
RECOMMENDATIONS ON PANDEMIC ANTIVIRAL DRUG USE, available at
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/appendixd.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2007); Anthony
B. Iton, Rationing Influenza Vaccine: Legal Strategies and Considerations for Local Health
Officials, 12 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. PRACTICE 349, 349 (2006); James G. Hodge, Jr.
& Jessica P. O'Connell, The Legal Environment Underlying Influenza Vaccine Allocation
and Distribution Strategies, 12 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. PRACTICE 340, 340-41 (2006).
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services, critical infrastructure, and sanitation. Similarly, the continued
functioning of governance structures, such as the executive, legislative, and
judicial systems, is important.
4. Medical Need/Vulnerability
As mentioned, medical need is a widely accepted rationing principle.
This criterion focuses on reducing serious illness and death among the most
vulnerable individuals. It requires a scientific or epidemiologic judgment
about at-risk groups that may vary. Seasonal influenza disproportionately
burdens infants and the elderly, but highly pathogenic strains may affect
young adults, as occurred with the Spanish flu.
5. Intergenerational Equity
The "medical need" criterion often favors the elderly because they are
the most vulnerable to influenza complications. However, interventions
may be less beneficial to the elderly than to younger, healthier populations.
Vaccines, for example, may be less effective in older people because of
poor immune system function.10 4 All human lives have equal worth, but
interventions targeted toward the young may save more years of life.
Would a "fair innings" principle militate in favor of children, young adults,
and pregnant women?
6. Social Justice/Equitable Access
What does justice tell us about how to ration scarce, life-saving
resources? The foregoing criteria have a clear utility but focus on key
personnel and sectors such as government, biomedical researchers, the
pharmaceutical industry, health care professionals, and essential workers or
first-responders. These apparently neutral categories mask injustice. In
each case, individuals gain access to life-saving technologies based on their
often high-status employment. This kind of health planning leaves out
individuals who are either unemployed or employed in "non-essential"
jobs-a proxy for the displaced and devalued members of society.
Consequently, public health planning based on pure utility, while
understandable, fails to have sufficient regard for the disenfranchised in
society.1
0 5
Social justice demands more than "fair" distribution of resources in
circumstances of extreme health emergency. The interests of vulnerable
populations are undermined well beyond the detriments to their health. A
104. Elizabeth M. Gardner et al., Age-Related Changes in the Immune Response to
Influenza Vaccination in a Racially Diverse, Healthy Elderly Population, 24 VACCINE 1609,
1610 (2006).
105. See generally Lawrence Gostin & Madison Powers, What Does Justice Require for
the Public's Health?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1053 (2006).
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failure to act expeditiously and with equal concern for all citizens,
including the poor and less powerful, harms the whole community by
eroding public trust and undermining social cohesion. It signals to those
affected and to everyone else that the basic human needs of some matter
less than those of others, and it thereby fails to show the respect owed to all
members of the community.
I0 6
7. Global Justice
Justice is not bound by national borders but binds the human community
around the globe. Scholars such as Martha Nussbaum10 7 have drawn
attention to the justice requirements of a shared humanity beyond
citizenship. Realistically, however, resources will go to those countries
where products are owned and manufactured. Major influenza vaccine
producers operate and distribute almost exclusively in Europe, North
America, Australia, and Japan. 108 This can have devastating consequences
for resource-poor countries that cannot compete economically for
expensive countermeasures. If all human life has equal value then there
would be a strong moral justification for fair rationing from a global
perspective. Even from a less altruistic perspective, there are reasons to
invest in poor regions. Improved surveillance and response can help in
early detection and containment of outbreaks, affording universal benefits.
8. Civic Engagement/Fair Processes
Public cooperation in a health emergency is more likely if citizens accept
the fairness and legitimacy of allocation decisions. Advance discussion of
ethical principles keeps the public informed and engages them in a
participatory decisionmaking process. A pilot project on civic engagement
found that stakeholders and citizens-at-large, at a high level of agreement,
chose a functioning society and reducing deaths as priorities in vaccine
allocation. 10 9 This altruistic consensus is comforting but may not reflect
real behavior in a time of crisis, which could involve hoarding, stockpiling,
and black marketeering. Citizens will agree to fair allocation if they
believe the allocation process is fair. However, if they believe that others
are jumping the queue through influence or money, they will be less likely
to behave selflessly. This is all the more reason for transparent
decisionmaking processes in advance of a pandemic.
106. Id.
107. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE
OF COUNTRY? ix, 4 (Martha C. Nussbaum ed., 2002) (advocating for an allegiance to the
worldwide community of human beings).
108. VACCINES FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA, supra note 51, at 4.
109. PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT PILOT PROJECT ON PANDEMIC INFLUENZA, CITIZEN VOICES ON
PANDEMIC FLU CHOICES 7 (2005).
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Planning for an influenza pandemic is vital to success. It requires
scientific innovation, modem laws, and ethical action. Private markets
cannot create stable supplies of life-saving countermeasures or assure fair
allocations. Rather, constructive partnerships among government, industry,
and the community can vastly improve survival and functioning in an
impending crisis.
II. PUBLIC HEALTH STRATEGIES:
ETHICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS
A. The Importance of Public Health Interventions
The United States has placed a high value on medical countermeasures
to prevent or contain a future influenza pandemic.110 Given the limitations
of medical countermeasures, however, public health interventions will be
vital tools for slowing the spread of an emerging pandemic. Two recent
IOM reports have also determined that the United States' emergency
medical system is "at the breaking point."'"11 In spite of these medical
infrastructure concerns, Congress recently appropriated only $350 million
to upgrade state and local capacity-about 9% of the $3.8 billion total
allocation for pandemic influenza."l 2 Furthermore, this limited funding
will be significantly eroded by a recent $105 million cut in federal support
for state public health1 13 and an unfunded mandate for states to purchase
antiviral drugs.14
This Part focuses on traditional public health interventions, drawing
lessons from past influenza pandemics 1 5 and the outbreaks of Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). 116 Unfortunately, public health
110. See Lawrence Gostin, Public Health Strategies for Pandemic Influenza: Ethics and
the Law, 295 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1700, 1700 (2006) (noting that 90% of spending on
pandemic preparation is devoted to countermeasures) [hereinafter Public Health Strategies
for Pandemic Influenza].
111. INST. OF MED., HOSPITAL-BASED EMERGENCY CARE: AT THE BREAKING POINT,
available at http://www.iom.edu/CMS/3809/16107/35007.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2007);
INST. OF MED., EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES AT THE CROSSROADS, available at
http://www.iom.edu/CMS/3809/16107/35010.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
112. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of
Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. § 247, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119
Stat. 2680, 2786 (2005).
113. HHS, FY 2005 BUDGET IN BRIEF 105 (2005), available at http://www.hhs.gov/
budget/05budget/fy2005bibfinal.pdf.
114. Jeffrey Levi et al., Working Group on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Joint
Statement in Response to Department of Health and Human Services Pandemic Influenza
Plan, 42 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 92, 93 (2006).
115. See generally BARRY, supra note 44, at 5 (expounding on the lessons learned in the
great influenza pandemic of 1918, which the author describes as "the first great collision
between nature and modem science").
116. Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Ethical and Legal Challenges Posed by Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome: Implications for the Control of Severe Infectious Disease Threats,
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strategies are difficult to evaluate. First, evidence of effectiveness is often
historical or anecdotal, with few systematic studies.' 17 Adequate resources
for population-based research are urgently needed.'1 8  Second, an
intervention's effectiveness depends on the transmission pattern, which
cannot be fully understood in advance. Key issues in the transmission
pattern include viral shedding (infectivity during pre- and post-
symptomatic stages); mode and efficiency of transmission (large droplet,
aerosol, contaminated hands and surfaces, etc.); incubation period (two
days between infection to the start of symptoms); and serial interval
between cases." 9  Third, an intervention's usefulness depends on the
pandemic phase. In the pandemic alert period, surveillance, medical
prophylaxis, and isolation are important tools. Yet, "[d]uring the pandemic
period, the focus shifts to delaying spread... through population-based
measures." 120 Thus, the key question is which measure, or combination of
measures, works best at each stage of the pandemic? Multiple, targeted
approaches are likely to be most effective, but they can have deep adverse
consequences for the economy and civil liberties. Even using the most
optimistic scenario, containing an emerging H5NI pandemic at its source
will only delay, not stop, mass transmission because of likely simultaneous
introductions of the pathogen.121
The remainder of this Article will examine the ethical and legal issues
associated with public health interventions. However, first it is necessary
to identify the human rights and ethical principles that will guide this
analysis.
B. Ethics and Human Rights
Pandemics can be deeply socially divisive, and the political response to
these issues not only impacts public health preparedness, but also is
important to a good and decent society. It is for this reason that it is
particularly important to show respect for public health ethics and
290 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 3229, 3229 (2003).
117. But see Neil M. Ferguson et al., Strategies for Containing an Emerging Influenza
Pandemic in Southeast Asia, 437 NATURE 209, 209-10 (2005) (modeling systematically the
pandemic spread of influenza in Southeast Asia and using studies done previously by the
United States and Britain to show the downward trend of deaths that may be caused by an
influenza pandemic).
118. INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY 17
(2003) [hereinafter THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH IN THE 21 ST CENTURY].
119. See Nonpharmaceutical Interventions for Pandemic Influenza, supra note 28, at 82-
83.
120. Id. at 88 (noting that difficulties in influenza control include "peak infectivity" early
in illness and short intervals between cases, among other factors).
121. Christina E. Mills et al., Pandemic Influenza: Risk of Multiple Introductions and the
Need to Prepare for Them, 3 PUB. LIBR. SCi. MED. 1, 4 (2006), available at
http://medicine.plosjoumals.org/perlserv/?request-get-document&doi = 10.1371/
joumal.pmed.0030135.
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international law-particularly human rights law-when developing
national policy for pandemic influenza. This Section sets out the relevant
ethical principles that should be considered when planning to combat a
highly pathogenic pandemic influenza outbreak.
1. International Human Rights
Basic human rights are inherent to all people because they are human;
they are universal, so that people everywhere are "rights-holders;" and they
create robust duties for the state.1 22 State duties encompass the obligations
to not interfere directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of human rights, to
prevent private actors from interfering with human rights, and to take
positive measures to enable and assist individuals and communities to
enjoy their rights. Basic human rights are protected under international law
so that a state can no longer assert that systematic maltreatment of its own
nationals is exclusively a domestic concern. 123
The main sources of human rights law are the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and two international covenants on human rights: the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), as well as an optional protocol to ICCPR.124  The United
Nations has promulgated numerous treaties dealing with specific human
rights violations including racial and gender discrimination, the rights of
children, genocide, and torture. 25 Human rights are also protected under
regional systems, including those in the Americas, Europe, and Africa.
26
122. Sofia Gruskin & Daniel Tarantola, Health and Human Rights (Francois-Xavier
Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights, Working Paper Series, Working Paper No.
10, 2000), available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/fxbcenter/FXBCWP 10-
Gruskin and Tarantola.pdf.
123. See Louis B. SoHiN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 5 (1973).
124. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G. A. Res. 217(111), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
125. See generally International Convention of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec.
21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; ICCPR, supra note 124; ICESCR, supra note 124; Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, G.A. Res.
45/158, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/45/149 (Dec. 18, 1990).
126. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123.
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a. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
The UDHR, adopted in 1948, identified specific rights and freedoms that
deserve promotion and protection. The UDHR was the international
community's first attempt to establish a common standard of achievement
for all peoples and all nations to promote human rights. The UDHR
represents a milestone in the struggle of humanity for freedom and human
dignity, stating that human rights are self-evident and the highest aspiration
of the common people. Article 1 proclaims that all human beings are born
free and equal in dignity and rights.
The Universal Declaration is not a treaty, but a resolution with no
explicit force of law. Nevertheless, its key provisions have so often been
applied and accepted that they are now widely considered to have attained
the status of customary international law. 127 The United Nations' General
Assembly has declared that the principles embodied in the Universal
Declaration "constitute basic principles of international law. ' 128 Moreover,
it has "acquired a moral and political authority equal to that of the [United
Nations] Charter."'' 29  In any event, the Declaration has inspired and
influenced many international conventions and is reflected in national
constitutions, legislation, and in the decisions of national and international
tribunals.
Most relevant to the ethics of public health interventions, the UDHR
provides that all people have the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest,
detention, or exile; the right of movement and residence within and
between the borders of each state, and the right to freedom from
discrimination. While the UDHR served as the preliminary description of
rights, two binding covenants, the ICCPR and ICESCR, followed.
b. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights &
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
The ICCPR imposes an immediate obligation to respect and to ensure
civil and political rights. A sister covenant, the ICESCR, requires state
parties "to take steps, individually and through international assistance and
co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its
127. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702 (1987) (listing the following state practices as violating customary international law
(CIL): genocide; slavery; murder or causing the disappearance of individuals; torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged arbitrary detention;
systematic racial discrimination; and consistent patterns of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights).
128. Creola Johnson, Quarantining HIV-Infected Haitians: United States' Violations of
International Law at Guantanamo Bay, 37 HOw. L.J. 305, 314 (1994).
129. David W. Johnston, Comment, Cuba's Quarantine of AIDS Victims: A Violation of
Human Rights?, 15 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 189, 194 (1992).
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available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized ... by all appropriate means, including
particularly the adoption of legislative measures."'' 30  The language of
progressive realization and maximum resources may have been inserted
because economic and social rights typically require greater funding and
more complex solutions than civil and political rights. Still, the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, established by the ICESCR,
made clear that state parties have immediate obligations. Steps towards the
goal of full realization must be taken within a reasonably short time. States
parties have a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of each of
the rights and should immediately implement legislation and judicial
remedies to ensure non-discrimination in the exercise of economic and
social rights. 131
These covenants provide a number of rights that are relevant to the
implementation of public health interventions including the right to
freedom from cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment; the
right to freedom of movement and residence; the right to freedom from
arbitrary detention; and most notably the right to health. The right to health
encompasses the international obligation for all nations to promote and
protect the health of its civilians, especially by facilitating access to basic
health care services. The right to health, however, is not equivalent to a
right to health care, nor is it an absolute right. It must be evaluated against
both the means available to the state and the biological and socio-
economical characteristics of the individual concerned. 132 Furthermore, the
right to health cannot be seen in a vacuum; it depends on the realization of
other human rights such as the right to life, the right to privacy and the
right to non-discrimination. The right to health thus encompasses a broad
spectrum of socio-economic factors and must be extrapolated to the
underlying determinants of health such as hygiene, housing, environment,
and clean drinking water.'
33
130. ICESCR, supra note 124, at art. 2.
131. See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3, The
Nature of States Parties' Obligations, 5th Sess., 1990, 5, Compilation of General
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N.
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (May 12, 2004).
132. See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14,
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, 22d Sess., 2000, 4, Compilation
of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty
Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.7 (May 12, 2004).
133. Seeid. 8, 11.
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c. Regional Conventions: The European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Its Protocols, and The
American Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
and its protocols (European Convention) and the American Convention on
Human Rights (American Convention) identify many of the same rights
and liberties as the Universal Declaration, including the right to privacy,
134
the right to be free from inhumane or degrading treatment, 135 the right to
freedom of movement, 136 and the right to be free from discrimination-all
of which public health measures could violate.
37
2. Valid Limitations on Human Rights
Human rights have transcending value, but international law allows
restrictions when necessary for the public good. The ICCPR's most
fundamental guarantees are so essential as to be absolute and no state may
derogate from them, even in a time of an emergency. The ICCPR,
however, allows state parties to suspend most other civil and political rights
in times of national crisis. The state must officially proclaim the public
emergency and cannot engage in discrimination. The principal conditions
for restraints on civil and political rights are that they must be prescribed by
law; enacted within a democratic society; and necessary to achieve public
order, public health, public morals, national security, public safety, or the
rights and freedoms of others. 38 However, state parties may not impose
restrictions aimed at the destruction of rights or their limitation to a greater
extent than provided in the Covenant.
39
134. See Eur. Council, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms as amended by Protocol No. 11, Nov. 1, 1998, Art. 8, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC 13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/
EnglishAnglais.pdf [hereinafter Fundamental Freedoms]; American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, art. 11.
135. See Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 134, art. 3.
136. See Eur. Council, Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocol No. 11, Nov. 1, 1998, Europ.
T.S. 46, Art. 2, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC 13-4318-
B457-5C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf.
137. See Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 134, art. 14.
138. See ICCPR, supra note 124, art. 12 3, art. 18 3, art. 19 3, art. 21, art. 22 2
(permitting "limitations" or "restrictions" on the freedom of movement, religion, expression,
assembly, and association).
139. See The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 7 HuM. RTS. Q. 3, 7 (1985)
[hereinafter Siracusa Principles] (calling for all limitation clauses to be interpreted strictly
and in favor of the human right at issue).
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The Siracusa Principles, conceptualized at a meeting in Siracusa, Italy,
are widely recognized as a legal standard for measuring the validity of
limitations on human rights. 140 The Principles make clear that even when
the state acts for a good reason, it must respect human dignity and freedom.
Echoing the language of the ICCPR, the Siracusa Principles require that
state limitations must be in accordance with the law; based on a legitimate
objective; strictly necessary in a democratic society; the least restrictive
and intrusive means available; and not arbitrary, unreasonable, or
discriminatory. 14 1  International tribunals have relied on the Siracusa
Principles to require states to use the least restrictive measure necessary to
achieve the public health purpose. 1
42
It is far more difficult to think about legitimate limitations on economic,
social, and cultural rights. The ICESCR permits "such limitations as are
determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature
of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare
in a democratic society." 143 Because the ICESCR includes a right to health,
it is best to conceptualize as valid "limitations" those measures necessary to
attain health protection for the population. For example, the Covenant
requires states to take steps aiming at "prevention, treatment and control
epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases."1 44 Thus, compulsory
measures such as vaccination, treatment, or isolation would be permitted
only if necessary to protect public health.
140. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council (ECOSOC), Status of the International Covenants
on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4 (Sept. 28, 1984).
141. Id. 15-21.
142. See Enhorn v. Sweden, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Robyn Martin, The Exercise of Public
Health Powers in Cases of Infectious Disease: Human Rights Implications, 14 MED. L. REV.
132, 134 (2006) (expounding on the European Court of Human Rights' use of the
substantive requirements of Article 5 that the court consider all alternatives such that it is
clear that less severe measures have been considered and that there is no arbitrariness in the
deprivation of liberty in any and all circumstances (citing Chahal v. U.K., 1996 Eur. Ct. H.
R. 22414/93)).
143. The language of Article 4 suggests that cultural, economic, or social rights can be
limited on grounds of the public's health. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, however, stresses that states have the burden of justifying each element of Article 4:
powers must be in accordance with the law, including international human rights, in the
interest of legitimate aims, and strictly necessary for the general welfare in a democratic
society. Public health powers also must be the least restrictive, of limited duration, and
subject to review. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Substantive
Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: .General Comment No. 14, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/E.C.12.2000.4.EnOpenDocument
[hereinafter General Comment 14].
144. Id. art. 12(2)(c).
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3. Public Health Ethics
These international human rights principles stress the importance of
individual rights and freedoms, but make clear that freedoms can be
restricted when the public health is threatened. Striking a balance between
the individual and the collective can be a difficult task, especially under
conditions of scientific uncertainty and crisis. Therefore, it is important to
articulate the values of public health ethics that should influence pre-
pandemic planning.
a. Public Health Necessity
Public health powers are exercised under the theory that they are
necessary to prevent an avoidable harm. Early meanings of the term
"necessity" are consistent with the exercise of police powers: to necessitate
was to "force" or "compel" a person to do that which he would prefer not
to do, and the "necessaries" were those things without which life could not
be maintained. 145 Government, to justify the use of compulsion, therefore,
must act only in the face of a demonstrable health threat. Public health
officials must be able to prove that they had "a good faith belief, for which
they can give supportable reasons, that a coercive approach is
necessary."'
14 6
The standard of public health necessity requires, at a minimum, that the
subject of the compulsory intervention must actually pose a threat to the
community. In the context of infectious diseases, for example, public
health authorities could not impose personal control measures (e.g.,
mandatory physical examination, treatment, or isolation) unless the person
was actually contagious or, at least, there was reasonable suspicion of
contagion. While this standard is obviously resistant to precise definition,
it is important that countries clearly delineate what criteria for suspicion
will be used and provide procedural safeguards.
b. Reasonable and Effective Means
Under the public health necessity standard, government may act only in
response to a demonstrable threat to the community. The methods used,
moreover, must be designed to prevent or ameliorate that threat. In other
words, there must be a reasonable relationship between the public health
intervention and the achievement of a legitimate public health objective.
Even though the objective of the legislature may be valid and beneficial, a
public health intervention must be an effective means of combating the
145. THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 728 (6th ed. 1976).
146. James F. Childress et al., Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain, 30 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 170, 173 (2002).
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public health threat. A policy that entails personal burdens and economic
costs is only justified if the government can demonstrate that there is a
reasonable chance of protecting the public health. 147  Because it is
extremely difficult to exactly define "reasonable chance" for all potential
situations, the government has the burden of proof and has to engage in
ongoing evaluation of the public health intervention and its effectiveness.
c. Proportionality
The public health objective may be valid in the sense that a risk to the
public exists, and the means may be reasonably likely to achieve that
goal-yet a public health regulation is unethical if the human burden
imposed is wholly disproportionate to the expected benefit. Public health
authorities have a responsibility not to overreach in ways that unnecessarily
invade personal spheres of autonomy. This suggests a requirement for a
reasonable balance between the public good to be achieved and the degree
of personal invasion. If the intervention is gratuitously onerous or unfair, it
may overstep ethical boundaries.
d. Distributive Justice
This ethical principle requires that the risks, benefits, and burdens of
public health action be fairly distributed, thus precluding the unjustified
targeting of already socially vulnerable populations. Tom Beauchamp and
James Childress view distributive justice as the "fair, equitable, and
appropriate distribution in society determined by justified norms that
structure the terms of social cooperation."
148
In the context of public health, this principle requires that officials act to
limit the extent to which the burden of disease falls unfairly upon the least
advantaged and to ensure that the burden of interventions themselves are
distributed equitably. 149  Thus, in the exercise of compulsory powers,
distributive justice requires a fair allocation so as not to burden unduly
particularly vulnerable populations. Distributive justice has been viewed as
so central to the mission of public health that it has been described as its
core value. As Dan Beauchamp has said, "[t]he historic dream of public
health ... is a dream of social justice."' 150
147. Id.
148. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 327
(4th ed. 1994).
149. See Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, International
Guidelines for Ethical Review of Epidemiological Studies, 19 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE
247 (1991); Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, Report of the Fifth
CIOMS Core Group Meeting on the Revision of 1991 International Guidelines for Ethical
Review of Epidemiological Studies (2005).
150. Dan E. Beauchamp, Public Health as Social Justice, in NEW ETHICS FOR THE
PUBLIC'S HEALTH 105 (Dan E. Beauchamp & Bonnie Steinbock eds., 1999).
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Distributive justice does not merely require a fair allocation of risks and
burdens. It also recognizes that public health often distributes benefits such
as vaccines, treatment, or other services. Problems of fair benefits
allocation arise under conditions of scarcity, where there is a competition
for resources. This might occur, for example, with a scarcity of medical
treatment in the midst of an influenza pandemic.
e. Trust and Transparency
Public health officials have the responsibility to involve the public in the
process of formulating public health policies as well as to explain and
justify any infringement on general moral considerations. Public health
officials should honestly disclose relevant information to the public.
Accordingly, citizens should have the right to request and receive
information. Moreover, citizens' input should be solicited. 5'
The need for transparency stems in part from the government's ethical
imperative to treat citizens with respect by offering reasons for policies that
infringe on moral considerations. 152 Transparency also is essential to create
and maintain public trust and accountability.' 53  Openness and
accountability are important to public health governance because of their
intrinsic value and capacity to improve decisionmaking. Citizens gain a
sense of satisfaction by participating in policymaking and having their
voices heard. Even if the government decides that personal interests must
yield to common needs, the individual feels acknowledged if she is listened
to and her values are taken into account.
Transparency also has instrumental value because it provides a feedback
mechanism-a way of informing public policy and arriving at more
considered judgments. Open forms of governance engender and sustain
public trust, which benefits the public health enterprise more generally.
Without public support, and the voluntary cooperation of those at risk,
coercive public health interventions would be difficult to achieve. The
populace must be able to trust that its government is acting in its best
interest.
151. See Childress et al., supra note 146, at 174; PUBLIC HEALTH LEADERSHIP SOCIETY,
PRINCIPLES OF THE ETHICAL PRACTICE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 3 (2002), available at
http://www.apha.org/codeofethics/ethicsbrochure.pdf [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF THE
ETHICAL PRACTICE OF PUBLIC HEALTH].
152. PRINCIPLES OF THE ETHICAL PRACTICE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 151, at 4;
Jayne Parry & John Wright, Community Participation in Health Impact Assessments:
Intuitively Appealing but Practically Difficult, 6 BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION 388, 388 (2003), available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/81/6/
parry.pdf.
153. See Parry & Wright, supra note 152, at 388 (citing the Gothenburg consensus paper,
which "makes clear the need for participation to underpin the assessment process in order to
maintain values of democracy, transparency and equity").
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In the following Sections, we examine ethical issues raised by major
public health interventions available for combating influenza. These
interventions often present hard tradeoffs between population health on the
one hand, and personal and economic interests on the other. Each Section
describes a proposed public health intervention and explains the ethical
problems connected with its implementation. An ethical solution to these
problems will follow. Because of the incredible strains that pandemic-
created crises put on even the best laid plans, in addition to the difficulty in
asserting one set of ethical ideals, each Section will also discuss the
mitigating factors that might make an ethical "ideal" impracticable. The
accompanying recommendations are designed to promote the ultimate
ethical ideal, but in a manner sensitive to the practical realities of a
pandemic. However, before beginning the ethical analysis of specific
public health interventions, it is useful to define these tools, as well as to
articulate some of the general themes that run throughout this Article.
D. Public Health Interventions
Given the limitations of medical countermeasures, public health
interventions will be vital for slowing the spread of an emerging
pandemic. 154 The following Section will briefly identify and describe the
various interventions. The Sections after that will explore general ethical
concerns that permeate all influenza pandemic public health interventions.
Subsequent sections will discuss each intervention in detail, focusing on
ethical issues and drawing lessons from past influenza pandemics 55 and the
outbreaks of SARS.1
56
E. General Ethical Themes in Public Health Responses to a Pandemic
1. Community Participation
The WHO's 1948 constitution states that "[i]nformed opinion and active
co-operation on the part of the public are of the utmost importance in
improving health."' 157 Community participation in pandemic preparedness
154. See Gostin et al., supra note 116, at 555 (emphasizing that "where feasible, rapid
deployment of vaccines or prophylaxis to groups at risk of acquiring infection should be
used to contain localized outbreaks"); Gostin, supra note 110, at 1700 (elaborating that
during the pandemic alert phase of an outbreak important intervention measures include
"surveillance, medical prophylaxis, and isolation").
155. See generally BARRY, supra note 44 (chronicling the developments in the 1918
influenza epidemic).
156. See Gostin et al., supra note 116, at 3229-36.
157. WHO CONST. pmbl., available at http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/
AboutSEARO-const.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2007) (stating that "[i]nformed opinion and
active co-operation on the part of the public are of the utmost importance in the
improvement of the health of the people").
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and response is critically important and ethically required. The ethical
principles of trust and transparency require that the public be involved in
decisions affecting their lives. During a pandemic, many actions taken will
impose losses on members of society, both in terms of money and
autonomy. Similarly, actions not taken will leave society at risk of disease.
Public health policymakers must use education and input from the public to
balance the risks of action versus inaction. This will help ensure that the
policies ultimately adopted are well-suited to local circumstances and
values.
At the national level, community participation will include advocacy,
delivery of services, cost-sharing, and support to patients. Each person
should have the opportunity to contribute to public discourse and thus must
be adequately informed instead of being "managed" by the authorities. The
government needs to identify its priorities, expectations, and financial
capacity. Thus, an ethically appropriate policy in one country, or even one
city, may be ethically inappropriate in another because of varying norms
and differing benefits or losses caused by intervention.
Community participation has a positive impact on the success of project
development and implementation and can reduce alienation of socially
excluded groups. 158  Time and resource constraints may considerably
complicate community outreach programs during a pandemic.
Consequently, governments must gain the public's trust by providing it
with adequate and accurate information well in advance. Of course, some
issues will develop very quickly or unexpectedly during a pandemic,
precluding advance information. In this case, governments should provide
necessary information as quickly as possible, and community involvement
in decisionmaking should be as great as allowed by the circumstances of a
situation. When expediency does not allow full community involvement
before policies are enacted, a post-enactment review process is particularly
important to ensure transparency and accountability and should incorporate
community involvement.
2. Expanded Research Agenda
The government must consider all possible strategies because it is
difficult to predict and evaluate the effectiveness of any specific
intervention. The key question is which measure, or combination of
measures, works best at each stage of the pandemic. A number of
considerations make this difficult to answer. First, evidence of
effectiveness is often historical or anecdotal, with few systematic studies
158. See Parry & Wright, supra note 152 (noting that community participation also may
"reorient power relationships with the professional decision-makers").
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available. 59  Second, an intervention's effectiveness depends on the
pandemic's transmission pattern, which is unpredictable. 60  Third, an
intervention's usefulness depends on the stage of the pandemic. In the
pandemic alert period, surveillance, medical prophylaxis, and isolation are
important tools. Yet, during a pandemic, the focus shifts to delaying spread
through non-pharmaceutical measures. 16  Evaluation of effectiveness is
important not only from a public health perspective, but also from an
ethical perspective. To the extent that interventions impose costs and
burdens on individuals or the population, they are ethically warranted only
to the extent that they are effective and proportionate in terms of benefits
and burdens.
Multiple targeted approaches are likely to be most effective, but they can
have significant adverse consequences for the economy and civil liberties.
As such, governments should employ the least restrictive options possible.
Given this principle and the uncertain utility associated with public health
interventions, evidence of effectiveness is important and relevant to the
ethical implications of public health interventions. Therefore, adequate
resources for population-based research are urgently needed. 1
62
3. Resource Allocation
Perhaps the greatest ethical issues of pandemic preparedness and
response deal with the allocation of scarce resources. A pandemic will
overtax the immediately available resources of even the richest countries
on the planet while overwhelming less wealthy countries. For example, in
1918, influenza-related mortality was highest in the least developed parts of
the world and lowest among the wealthiest countries. 163 Given the greater
baseline levels of mortality, the higher prevalence of HIV/AIDS (and many
other diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis), and reduced access to
health care that is found in many developing countries, one can reasonably
expect these countries to experience greater morbidity and mortality from
influenza in a modem pandemic as well. At the same time, these countries
will have the least resources available to protect their citizens and to slow
the transmission of the disease.
159. But see Neil M. Ferguson et al., supra note 117, at 213-14 (delineating various
models and data sources used to predict the success of possible interventions).
160. See Nonpharmaceutical Interventions for Pandemic Influenza, supra note 28, at 92
(adding that because of this and other uncertainties, "WHO guidance is subject to revision
based on additional information").
161. See id. at 88-93 (describing measures such as social distancing, procedures for those
leaving or entering infected zones, and hygiene measures and personal protection).
162. THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH IN THE 21 ST CENTURY, supra note 118, at 6.
163. Niall P.A.S. Johnson & Juergen Mueller, Updating the Accounts: Global Mortality
of the 1918-1920 "Spanish "Influenza Pandemic, 76 BULL. HIST. MED. 105, 105-15 (2002).
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The demands of distributive justice require that resources be expended
equitably, with attention paid to meeting the needs of those who are most
vulnerable. In the context of pandemic influenza, this means that resources
must be used in a fashion that can alleviate the greatest amount of human
suffering and death. If the developing world is at the greatest peril from the
disease, then wealthy countries have a duty to assist them to provide the
greatest degree of protection that is feasible given the worldwide scarcity of
resources. Furthermore, at least early in a pandemic, resource sharing will
benefit both wealthy and developing countries. Models of influenza
transmission indicate that a pandemic can be stopped early on if adequate
resources are used,' 64 but all available measures are expected only to slow
transmission once a full-fledged pandemic is underway.165 To the extent
that a pandemic is likely to begin in a less developed country, effectiveness
of the intervention demands that wealthy countries assist poorer countries
to combat a nascent pandemic.
Additionally, in all countries, a fair system for allocating health-
promoting resources must be developed, as the demand for medical care,
hygienic measures, and other resources is likely to exceed the supply. This
should be done with attention paid to obtaining the greatest degree of
health promotion possible. To the extent possible, there should be
transparency and broad participation in the rationing scheme.
4. International Cooperation and Coordination
The protection of the public health and national risk management is
primarily the responsibility of national authorities. All countries therefore
should develop a national influenza preparedness plan. In designing a
justifiable containment strategy, each state needs to consider state-specific
factors such as national political structures and principles, educational and
cultural environment, the prevalence of the virus, and the strengths and
weaknesses of the state's health care system. While different national
approaches ordinarily are not a problem, considerable variation in response
plans could prevent or delay an efficient response in a multi-country public
health emergency. 66  Cooperation among national authorities and
coordination by international bodies is therefore necessary. 67
164. Neil M. Ferguson et al., Strategies for Mitigating an Influenza Pandemic, 442
NATURE 448 (2006).
165. Id. at210-12.
166. Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act:
Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases,
288 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 622, 624 (2002).
167. Id.
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The WHO put particular emphasis on cooperation and coordination in its
2005 International Health Regulations (the Regulations), a revision of the
1969 text. The Regulations require countries to develop, strengthen, and
maintain core public health capacities to detect, assess, and notify the
WHO of events that may constitute a public health emergency of
international concern via National IHR Focal Points in each State Party.'68
In June 2007, the Regulations will become legally binding on all WHO
Member States, except those that have rejected them or submitted
reservations. In light of the concern surrounding avian influenza, in May
2006, the 59th World Health Assembly adopted Resolution 59.2, which
called upon WHO Member States to comply immediately and voluntarily
with the provisions of the Regulations relevant to the pandemic influenza
risk.
In addition to cooperation at the state level, there is a need for
cooperation between international agencies. The response to a pandemic,
especially in its early stages, will be borne by many international agencies,
including the WHO, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Additionally, national
entities, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in
the United States, will be responsible for picking up international burdens
during a pandemic. It will be important for knowledge gained by one
entity to be disseminated quickly to other entities. Further, given the
scarcity of resources that will be available to stem a pandemic, it will be
important that work done by one agency not be unnecessarily duplicated by
others-efforts spent unnecessarily will trade off with other, potentially
life-saving efforts.
F. Public Health Surveillance
Surveillance is the backbone of public health, providing essential data to
understand the epidemic threat and inform the public. Surveillance
strategies include rapid diagnosis, screening, reporting, case management
reporting, contact investigations, and monitoring trends. It is clear that
surveillance will be necessary to quickly identify and respond to a
pandemic influenza outbreak. The revised regulations require that, once a
country identifies a signal suggesting human-to-human transmission, the
country must immediately investigate and notify WHO of the event
because any human influenza caused by a new subtype must be reported to
168. David P. Fidler & Lawrence 0. Gostin, The New International Health Regulations:
An Historic Development for International Law and Public Health, 33 J. LAW, MED.
& ETHICS 85 (2006); WHO, Revision of the International Health Regulations (2005),
available at http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/WHA58_3-en.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2007)
[hereinafter Revision of the International Health Regulations].
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WHO. The "triggering criteria" of early pandemic activity cannot be fully
set out ahead of time. Public health officials should thus be vigilant and
report all plausible signals that a pandemic virus may be emerging.
1. Global Responsibility to Develop Core Surveillance Capacities
Ideally, all countries would have the capacity to perform core
surveillance functions. However, such a recommendation is impractical for
many developing countries, which often lack the resources for animal or
human surveillance and containment of outbreaks. 169 Specifically, in sub-
Saharan Africa, the capacity for veterinary and human surveillance is
limited or nonexistent.170 In this and in other impoverished regions,
allocating resources for the development or improvement of surveillance
infrastructure may divert resources from a country's other, more immediate
needs.1 7' It can be difficult, for example, to convince the government of a
developing country that has a high incidence of HIV or malaria to invest
scarce resources towards the monitoring of a potential influenza threat.
Developed countries should be aware of this tradeoff and take measures
to ensure that enhanced surveillance does not occur at the expense of
managing the multitude of ongoing public health threats many developing
countries face. Recognizing this imperative, many countries have pledged
significant funds to meet the costs estimated by the World Bank to contain
avian influenza. 72 These funds will only temporarily address the need for
surveillance, however. The avian flu threat might not manifest itself for
years, and future pandemics are almost certain to occur. Thus, it would be
desirable to pursue the larger goal of creating sustainable public health
systems across the globe. To this end, WHO's Commission on
Macroeconomics and Health estimates that industrialized countries would
have to spend $27 billion in 2007 to meet global needs for essential public
health services.
173
169. Public Health Strategies for Pandemic Influenza, supra note 110.
170. Cathy A. Petti et al., Laboratory Medicine in Africa: A Barrier to Effective Health
Care, 42 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 377 (2006).
171. See id. (contending, however, that failure to improve surveillance infrastructure
ultimately costs more as "unreliable and inaccurate laboratory diagnostic testing leads to
unnecessary expenditures").
172. See Beijing Declaration, International Pledging Conference on Avian and Human
Pandemic Influenza, Jan. 18, 2006, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
PROJECTS/Resources/40940-1136754783560/beijingdeclaration.pdf; WORLD BANK, AVIAN
AND HUMAN INFLUENZA: FINANCING NEEDS AND GAPS 8 (2005), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/2015336-
1135192689095/20766293/AHIFinancingGAPSFINAL12-21 .pdf.
173. See COMM'N ON MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH, WHO, MACROECONOMICS AND
HEALTH: INVESTING IN HEALTH FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 11 (2001), available at
http://www.emro.who.int/cbi/pdf/CMHReportHQ.pdf (adding that the funding required
would increase over time, rising to $38 billion by 2015).
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2. Mitigating Privacy and Autonomy Risks
Surveillance poses privacy risks as governments must collect sensitive
medical information from patients, travelers, migrants, and other vulnerable
populations. 74  Many countries have data protection statutes; however,
these laws often make exceptions for surveillance in the context of a public
health threat. 175 In a crisis situation, however, disclosure may be warranted
when the immediate use of the information is necessary for an important
public health purpose and disclosure is restricted to the confines of the
public health system. Under these circumstances, the identity of the
affected person should be protected as much as possible. The inclusion of
any uniquely identifiable characteristics, such as a name, government
identification number, fingerprint, or phone number should be avoided,
particularly when the information is released outside of the public health
system. Cases should stay anonymous or encrypted when reasonably
feasible. Only the minimum amount of information necessary to achieve
the goal should be released, and to as few people as possible.
Screening and testing also can pose serious threats to a person's privacy
and bodily integrity. Ideally, public health officials should receive the
individual's informed consent prior to performing any medical tests;
however, in rare cases, mandatory testing might be necessary to advance
the public good. A mandatory testing policy may be permissible when it is
clearly necessary and effective in protecting the public health, it is
performed by competent public health officials, and the least intrusive
means are being used. At a minimum, compulsory testing should be
limited to individuals known or at least suspected to be infected and should
be done in a fair and non-discriminatory way. In addition, the individuals
whose rights are being infringed should be informed of the reasons for the
infringement.
Countries should enact public health information privacy laws to require
justifiable criteria for data disclosure and to prohibit wrongful disclosures,
for example, to employers, insurers, and immigration or criminal justice
authorities. 76  Whenever a government authorizes or mandates the
174. See generally Ronald Bayer & Amy Fairchild, The Limits of Privacy: Surveillance
and the Control of Disease, 10 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 19 (2002) (discussing the "ethics of
surveillance" through analysis of the history of surveillance and reporting in the context of
HIV and other infectious diseases).
175. See, e.g., Eur. Parl. and Council Directive 95/46, arts. 3, 13, 1995 0. J. (L 281) 35
(EC); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. § 1320
(1996).
176. See Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Informational Privacy and the Public's Health: The
Model State Public Health Privacy Act, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1388 (2001).
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disclosure of identifiable health data, it should make public the proposed
use of the data, the reason for disclosure, and the extent to which third
parties can have access to the data.
G. Limiting Animal/Human Pathogen Interchange
Close proximity between animals and humans poses serious risks as
novel pathogens mutate and jump species. 177 Live bird markets, traveling
poultry workers, fighting cocks, and migratory birds are vectors for
spreading avian influenza. 78  Recently, Influenza (A) H5NI also has
spread to tigers, 179 leopards,1 80 pigs,' 81 domestic cats, 182 and stone
martens. 183 Consequently, an early preventive strategy is critical to limiting
animal/human interchange. Strategies to diminish the risk include
separation of animal and human populations, health and safety in animal
farming, and proper management of diseased or exposed animals.
1. Avoiding Proximity
Safe farming practices and the separation of animals and humans are
critically important from a public health and economic perspective.
Avoiding proximity between animals and humans can reduce the risk that
the avian H5N1 virus will mutate and jump species.184 The separation is
hard to accomplish, however, given a culture of close contact between
animals and humans in most countries. For example, the domestication of
poultry is often necessary for family survival 185 and in many African and
Asian countries, backyard chickens are kept not only for food but also as
pets. 186 As one researcher reports, in Hong Kong, "thousands of residents
are avid birdwatchers and Kowloon's famed Bird Garden is one of the
world's largest marketplaces for exotic birds of all kinds."', 87 Given these
177. See William B. Karesh & Robert A. Cook, The Human-Animal Link, 84 FOREIGN
AFF. 38, 38, 42 (2005).
178. See Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Infection in Humans, supra note 11, at 1374.
179. See Roongroje Thanawongnuwech et al., Probable Tiger-to-Tiger Transmission of
Avian Influenza H5N1, II EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 975 (2005).
180. See Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), Avian Influenza-Related Issues,
http://www.fao.org/ag/AGAinfo/subjects/en/health/diseases-cards/avian-issues.htm
[hereinafter FAQ Report] (last visited Feb. 1, 2007) (reporting that the avian flu has been
detected in a leopard in Thailand).
181. See id. (noting that in Vietnam the avian flu virus has been discovered in a limited
number of pigs).
182. See WHO, H5NI Avian Influenza in Domestic Cats (Feb. 28, 2006),
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2006_02_28a/en.
183. See WHO, Avian Influenza-H5N1 Infection Found in a Stone Marten in Germany
(Mar. 9, 2006), http://www.who.int/csr/don/2006-03_09a/en.
184. See Public Health Strategies for Pandemic Influenza, supra note 110, at 1701.
185. See Playing Chicken with Bird Flu, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at A18.
186. See id.
187. MIKE DAVIS, THE MONSTER AT OUR DOOR: THE GLOBAL THREAT OF AvIAN FLU 45
(2005).
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cultural norms, policies separating animal and human populations can
cause not only economic hardship but also social unrest. Thus,
governments and health care sectors should publicize clear rationales for
such separation orders and should initiate and facilitate constructive public
discussion about measures that can be taken to suppress the transmission of
the virus.
2. Due Process and Compensation for Culling Decisions
Given that disease containment strategies can have a profound impact on
the lives of individuals, it is ethically imperative that governments carefully
construct their animal control policies. While mass slaughter of diseased
and exposed animals seems to be the most logical way to achieve
eradication of H5NI, it raises significant ethical concerns. A massive
culling of birds can have a devastating economic toll on the poultry
industries of the affected nations and the livelihoods of all classes of
poultry owners, producers and their employees. Economic studies further
indicate that those hardest hit by culling of flocks are individual farmers
whose sole source of income generation is their poultry. 88 While culling
has already played an important role in combating the current avian
influenza strain, more convincing scientific evidence of its effectiveness in
combating a pandemic influenza is needed for it to be ethically acceptable.
Moreover, the appearance of H5NI in wild birds and mammals has
significantly diminished the possible advantages culling could bring.
For culling decisions to be justified, the public benefit should outweigh
the personal and economic burdens placed on individuals. Judicial
procedures are necessary to fairly balance societal interests and the
interests of affected individuals. Governments should incorporate due
process into their culling procedures by creating an a priori procedure for
fair reviews of a decision to cull. Affected individuals should receive some
notice of the proposed containment measure and be permitted to consult
with counsel; if they cannot afford counsel, the government should provide
one; a subsequent hearing should be held as soon as possible after the
decision to cull; and the hearing should be held before an independent and
accountable tribunal so as to allow farmers and families to protest
erroneous or arbitrary decisions. Ideally, individuals should be allowed to
appeal the tribunal's final order.
The extent to which procedures can be implemented depends, however,
on the urgency of the emergency and the availability of resources. Public
health officials might have to mitigate the ideal procedural standards in
certain circumstances. Therefore, at the very least, to ensure non-
188. FAO Report, supra note 180.
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discrimination and proportionality, public health officials need to publicly
justify their decisions and the criteria applicable to the proposed measures.
Moreover, the process by which decisions are made should be open to
scrutiny, and the basis upon which decisions are made should be publicly
accessible. Transparency and community participation in the
decisionmaking process will enhance trust and acceptance. Post hoc
review measures should be put in place to ensure that decisionmakers are
accountable for their actions.
The economic impact of culling decisions, especially on small farmers,
is significant. Consequently, the principles of distributive justice and
reciprocity require adequate compensation as an ethical imperative. 189 This
compensation could include providing alternate sources of food if culling
involves depleting a family's source of nourishment. A recommendation of
this nature will be useless, however, without financial aid from developed
countries. In light of the economic consequences, when poultry export
industries and the livelihood of farmers are at stake, it is uncertain that
affected countries and individuals will be sincere about reporting the extent
to which their flocks are infected. 190 Adequate compensation and open
communication will, however, increase the incentive to report outbreaks.
In addition, education programs should be directed to decreasing the stigma
and social hostility toward infected people and countries. International
cooperation and coordination will be essential.
3. Mitigating the Economic Impact of Trade Restrictions
Avian influenza causes severe financial and trade impacts. Recent H5N 1
outbreaks have adversely affected industry profitability, employment,
household livelihoods, and, potentially, food security, in many countries
around the globe. Hundreds of millions of domesticated fowl have been
culled or have died of infection, devastating domestic poultry production.191
The overall impact of the current strain of avian influenza hurts all
livestock sectors by increasing price volatility and generating uncertainties
in markets. Research shows that "[t]he short-term costs to economies are
considerable, and even short-term market impacts have long-term
implications for trading patterns, policy formulation, longer-term
investment in the sector, and overall industry and sector development."'
' 92
189. Karesh & Cook, supra note 177.
190. See Lydia Polgreen, Nigeria Tries TV Jingles, Anything to Chip Away at Ignorance
of Spreading Bird Flu, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, at 17 ("The rapid spread of the disease to
neighboring states, along with the near-impossibility of enforcing bans on moving birds
around the country, has led veterinary experts to conclude that the virus will be nearly
impossible to stamp out in Africa.").
191. Dennis Normile, Are Wild Birds to Blame?, 310 Sci. 426, 426 (2005).
192. TOBY MOORE & NANCY MORGAN, AVIAN INFLUENZA: TRADE ISSUES 6 (2006),
available at http://www.cast-science.org/cast/news/aviantrade.pdf.
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The detection of the avian influenza virus threatens not only to transform
the eating habits of the population, but also to sharply curtail the export
market. Many countries have introduced large-scale import controls and
bans in response to outbreaks. For example, the United States and India
ban the import of all birds from affected areas; 193 European authorities ban
poultry and feathers from the Black Sea region; 194 Japan bans the import of
all poultry products from France; 195 China, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and
the Republic of Korea banned imports from the United States following a
reported outbreak of a less virulent strain of avian influenza.1 96 Some
countries even prohibit the importation of birds from nations that vaccinate
their flocks, arguing that the vaccines (although usually protective) mask
symptoms in infected birds.197 When considering a trade restriction, ethical
considerations should balance the risk to the public's health against the
harm that will be done by the restriction.
Nuisance bans on poultry imports because of small, localized outbreaks
of the H5N1 virus in exporting countries should be avoided. In May 2005,
the OIE advised governments to "allow trade to occur from certain zones or
from compartments within a country even though avian influenza may be
present in a completely separate zone or compartment in that country."'198
To that end, the regionalization of bans should be promoted. Timely
dissemination of all relevant information about influenza outbreaks,
interactions among animal and human health authorities, and rapid
containment and eradication of the virus where it has emerged are
necessary conditions for regional bans to be effective.
H. Community Hygiene and Hospital Infection Control
Hygienic measures to prevent the spread of respiratory infections are
broadly accepted and have been widely used in previous influenza
pandemics199 and the SARS outbreaks, although with uncertain benefits.
200
193. CNTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, EMBARGO OF BIRDS FROM
SPECIFIED COUNTRIES (2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/outbreaks/
embargo.htm.
194. Commission Decision 2006/7/EC, art. 1, 2006 0. J. (L. 205) 1 (EC).
195. Andrew Jack et al., Farmers Angry as 20 Countries Ban French Poultry Imports,
FIN. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, at 3.
196. FAO Report, supra note 180.
197. Elaine Sciolino, The Discovery of Avian Flu on a Turkey Farm Sends French
Poultry Industry Into a Tailspin, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, at 17.
198. MOORE & MORGAN, supra note 192, at 4.
199. Influenza: A Report of the American Public Health Association, 71 J. AM. MED.
ASS'N 2068 (1918).
200. See WHO, HOSPITAL INFECTION CONTROL GUIDANCE FOR SEVERE ACUTE
RESPIRATORY SYNDROME (SARS) (2003), available at http://www.who.int/csr/sars/
infectioncontrol/en/ [hereinafter HOSPITAL INFECTION CONTROL GUIDANCE]; CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, PUBLIC HEALTH GUIDANCE FOR COMMUNITY-LEVEL
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE TO SEVERE ACUTE RESPIRATORY SYNDROME (SARS) (2005),
[59:1
2007] PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: ETHICS, LAW, AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH 161
Infection control includes hand-washing, disinfection, respiratory hygiene,
and personal protective equipment (PPE).20 1 Evidence supports the use of
hand hygiene and hospital infection control measures, but the effectiveness
of disinfection, respiratory hygiene, and PPE in the community is
202 i
unclear. Research is needed to understand the appropriate role of
community hygiene in a future pandemic. For example, mask use was
common during the 1918 influenza pandemic and SARS outbreaks, but no
controlled studies have evaluated its effectiveness.
203
1. Encouraging Community Hygiene
Even if hygienic measures are effective, professionals and the public
must use them properly and sustainably. Infection control is challenging
(e.g., appropriately-fitted N95 respirators) and must be used reliably until
the risk subsides. Studies demonstrate inconsistent infection control in
hospitals, and the general public has not uniformly adopted even basic
hygiene practices such as hand-washing.2°4 During the SARS epidemic,
people in affected areas used protective measures inconsistently.0 5
It is important to accurately inform the public of the need for hygienic
measures, including the uncertainty of the measures' effectiveness. In past
epidemics, misinformation has been rampant, leading to substantial public
anxiety, reliance on word of mouth for knowledge, and purchase of
ineffective and expensive products.20 6 Issues of distributive justice arise
because ineffective or inaccurate communications will impact the most
marginalized members of society most heavily. Marginalized members of
society are those without access to alternative, credible sources of
information and those for whom wasting resources would have the greatest
adverse effects. Finally, information should be provided to the public so
individuals are able to make informed decisions about their health. The
information disseminated through public education campaigns should be
clear, uncomplicated, and not sensational or alarmist. Research indicates
that panic is rare during civil emergencies, but that providing clear,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/guidance/I/index.htm.
201. See HOSPITAL INFECTION CONTROL GUIDANCE, supra note 200.
202. See generally Influenza: A Report of the American Public Health Association,
supra note 199; Bernard Lo & Mitchell H. Katz, Clinical Decision Making During Public
Health Emergencies: Ethical Considerations, 143 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 493 (2005);
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, COMMUNITY CONTAINMENT MEASURES,
INCLUDING NON-HOSPITAL ISOLATION AND QUARANTINE (2004), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/guidance/D/index.htm.
203. Nonpharmaceutical Interventions for Pandemic Influenza, supra note 28.
204. See, e.g., AMER. SOC. FOR MICROBIOLOGY, HAND WASHING SURVEY FACT SHEET,
available at http://www.washup.org/assets/fact-sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
205. Janice Y.C. Lo et al., Respiratory Infections During SARS Outbreak, Hong Kong,
2003, 11 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1738 (2005).
206. Lesley Rosling & Mark Rosling, Pneumonia Causes Panic in Guangdong Province,
326 BRIT. MED. J. 416 (2003).
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consistent, credible, and instructive information will assist the public in
coping with fear.2°7 It is important to avoid information that fails to treat
members of the public as rational agents. The public should be treated as a
partner, enhancing the principle of transparency.
Planning for community-level preparedness should account for
variations in settlement patterns. Different types of settlements will present
unique risks and challenges during a pandemic. Similarly, communities'
unique cultural characteristics can interact with emergency preparedness
endeavours. Public education campaigns are difficult when multiple
languages are spoken in a community and when individuals have varying
levels of literacy and access to media. Preparation plans must account for
these geographic and cultural differences. They also must include diverse
media sources, which can be achieved by encouraging community
involvement in the planning and implementation process and by utilizing
leaders from community subpopulations.
A lack of mass media infrastructure will impede broad dissemination of
information in some areas. Resource constraints also prevent some
populations from receiving messages that are distributed via costly media
and a lack of governmental infrastructure may make dissemination of
messages much more difficult. Furthermore, media may not be universally
available to cater to particular subpopulations and insufficiently educated
portions of the population.
However, countries should strive to reduce these problems by using
existing communication networks. Health care workers and trusted
community sources should be consulted and informed about hygiene
measures in order to assist communication efforts by tailoring messages
and making them accessible to target audiences. Messages should be
posted in places such as markets, where the whole community is likely to
see them.
2. Ensuring the Appropriate Use of Hospital Infection Control
Guidance exists to prevent the SARS-associated corona virus from
spreading quickly in hospitals.0 8 Disinfection, hand hygiene, PPE, and
aerosol-generating procedures should be standard hospital practices.20 9
Because of the historically high attack rate of influenza among health care
workers,2 1° the high degree of transmission from people not demonstrating
207. Thomas A. Glass & Monica Schoch-Spana, Bioterrorism and the People: How to
Vaccinate a City Against Panic, 34 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 217, 218-20 (2002).
208. See, e.g., HOSPITAL INFECTION CONTROL GUIDANCE, supra note 200.
209. Id.
210. C. Beguin, B. Boland & J. Ninane, Health Care Workers: Vectors of Influenza
Virus? Low Vaccination Rates Among Hospital Health Care Workers, 13 AM. J. MED.
QUAL. 223, 223, 227 (1998).
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clinical illness, 211 and the ease of transmission in crowded areas,2 12 health
practitioners who do not practice strict infection control may amplify
disease transmission. It is vital to train health care workers and monitor the
use of such measures. This could be done through legal oversight or
licensing requirements.
There also are ethical concerns relating to hospital infection control and
distributive justice. The level of resources that can be dedicated to
infection control will vary substantially between and within countries.
Recognizing this, a fair system of allocating scarce infection control
resources should be developed. It is important to involve hospital staff in
planning for the implementation of heightened infection controls and the
creation of a fair system for determining who carries out high-risk tasks.
Cultural sensitivity should be employed and control methods that require
restricting valued personal and cultural behaviors (such as the shaving of
beards to properly fit masks) should be carried out through consultation
with affected people. Additionally, one should ensure that the
implemented policies reflect the best available scientific research.
Nations should create training and monitoring programs to ensure that
hospitals effectively use standard infection control procedures. Training
programs are most effective when based on available science and provide
practitioners with the information needed to minimize risks to them and
their patients. Programs should be created with the involvement of
practitioners, while implementation of these programs should be adapted to
the specific features of health care institutions.
Limitations may impede countries' abilities to implement an ideal
training and monitoring program. Some countries will lack the resources to
purchase adequate PPE for a disease of long duration, while other countries
may lack sufficient health care infrastructure to implement new programs
on a speedy basis. Civil unrest may impede monitoring of programs. In
such cases, legal infrastructure may have to be developed to enforce
compliance with training and monitoring efforts.
Alternatives exist for countries facing substantial limitations. The
strictness of infection control may have to be relaxed; for example, surgical
masks may have to be substituted for N95 respirators. If areas do not have
access to isolation rooms, segregating infectious patients into separate
wards or hospitals or recommending home stay for mildly ill patients may
be appropriate. Additionally, training without full oversight may be
necessary should monitoring become infeasible.
211. C. Fraser et al., Factors that Make an Infectious Disease Outbreak Controllable,
101 PROCS. OF THE NAT. ACAD. OF Sci. 6146, 6151 (2004).
212. Nonpharmaceutical Interventions for Pandemic Influenza, supra note 28.
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Countries will also have to develop a method to ration scarce protective
equipment. Governments will have to determine how to distribute masks
and other PPE in a fair manner. Such plans should give serious
consideration to questions of justice and seek to find a rationing scheme
that maximizes health protection. Plans should be devised openly, with an
opportunity for both experts and the public to be heard. It is important to
enact a fair distribution process.
Additionally, policymakers will have to address the problem of critical
shortages in infection control and patient care equipment (e.g., particulate
respirators, surgical facemasks, hand sanitizers, disinfectants, ventilators,
intensive care beds, and the like).213 Given the potential duration and scope
of a pandemic, even increased production of PPE will be overwhelmed by
the demand, especially if use in hospitals and the community is widespread.
International collaboration will be needed to address this problem. Further
research is needed to develop reusable respirators214 and to determine the
effectiveness of alternatives to N95 respirators. 215 It is critical that research
is conducted collaboratively and that results are shared in a fashion that
fosters trust and transparency. Cooperation between companies,
governments, and researchers will facilitate improved production and
greater efficiency at meeting shortages of equipment.
L Decreased Social Mixing/Increased Social Distance
Past experience shows that social separation and community restrictions
form a significant response to pandemics. 216 There is limited evidence that
school closure reduces seasonal influenza transmission, 217 and it is assumed
that decreased social mixing slows the spread of respiratory disease.218
Thus, societies have closed public places and cancelled public events in the
face of pandemics. As fear rises, individuals may shun social gatherings.
Predicting the effect of policies to increase social distance is difficult
because infected persons and their contacts may be displaced into other
settings, and individuals may voluntarily separate in response to perceived
213. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., States and Cities Lag in Readiness to Fight Bird Flu, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 6, 2006, at Al (predicting that 67% of all intensive care beds would be filled
with patients suffering from influenza).
214. INST. OF MED., REUSABILITY OF FACEMASKS DURING AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC:
FACING THE FLU 63 (2006), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/l 1637.html.
215. Id. at 68.
216. See AVIAN INFLUENZA: ASSESSING THE PANDEMIC THREAT, supra note 20, at 6. See
generally Alexandra Minna Stem & Howard Markel, International Efforts to Control
Infectious Diseases, 1851 to the Present, 292 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1474 (2004).
217. Anthony Heymann et al., Influence of School Closure on the Incidence of Viral
Respiratory Diseases Among Children and on Health Care Utilization, 23 PEDIATRIC
INFECTIOUS DISEASE J. 675, 677 (2004).
218. Nonpharmaceutical Interventions for Pandemic Influenza, supra note 28, at 81.
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risk. 2 1 9 For these reasons, additional research needs to be conducted on
behavior during epidemics and the effects of social distancing on
transmission.
Social separation, particularly for long durations, can cause loneliness
and emotional detachment, disrupt social and economic life, and jeopardize
individual rights. Community restrictions raise profound questions of faith
(religious worship), family (funeral attendance), and protection of the
vulnerable (food, water, clothing, medical care).
1. Government Authority and Accountability
Undoubtedly, most judicial systems would uphold reasonable
community restrictions, but legal and logistical questions loom: Who has
the power to order closure, under what criteria do they have such power,
and for how long? What threshold of disease should trigger closure, and
should thresholds be different for different entities? Under what
circumstances should compensation for closures be paid? What should be
the penalties for non-compliance? Enforcement and assurance of
population safety remain critically important, but unanswered, questions in
most countries.
One might fear that governments would restrict personal liberties
unnecessarily. This could occur through implementing restrictions before
they are needed, extending restrictions beyond a disease crisis, or enacting
restrictions that do not decrease influenza transmission. In these situations,
closures could encroach on the important values of necessity and
proportionality. Furthermore, it is important to remember that restrictive
policies will be borne most heavily by those with the fewest resources, so
errant social distancing actions have distributive justice implications.
Lastly, one might worry that governments would use social distancing in a
discriminatory fashion, scapegoating ethnic or religious minorities, or using
social distancing to pretextually crack down on dissidents who assemble to
protest.
Ideally, questions of government authority and accountability would be
answered by policy decisions made before a pandemic hit and created as
part of an open and transparent process that encourages input from all
portions of society. Governments should explicitly define who has the
power to order social distancing strategies, and for what period of time.
Governments should also clearly state the criteria under which such power
is exercisable and clearly delineate the legitimate bases for any differential
treatment. Penalties should be proportional to offenses and not based on
irrational fears or discriminatory beliefs.
219. Ferguson et al., supra note 117, at 211-12.
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However, one must recognize that detailed pandemic influenza
preparations are not the highest priorities for many countries dealing with
important and immediate concerns. Furthermore, some countries lack the
legal and governmental infrastructures to implement the ideal plan outlined
above. At the very least, governments should dedicate themselves to non-
discrimination and transparency before an influenza pandemic occurs. It is
important that social distancing policies are implemented fairly and with
broad planning involvement. This will not only help safeguard important
ethical considerations, but also will improve the likelihood that the public
will accept social distancing. Given that compliance with social distancing
instructions will be difficult to enforce, public acceptance is critical to the
measures' success.
2. Workplace Closings
Workplace and school closings present difficult ethical issues. Apart
from the uncertainty of their effectiveness, the most important questions are
those of distributive justice. Workplaces represent the livelihoods of both
employees and entrepreneurs, so closing them can cause severe financial
hardships. Lost profits caused by closures may force companies to go out
of business, leading to job losses and other economic hardships. These
problems may have a significant effect on anyone, but especially for those
living at a subsistence level. Prior to an emergency, public health
authorities should cooperate with industry and trades unions to establish
mutually agreeable work closure procedures. However, for situations
where workplaces should close but do not, employment protections are
needed for workers who wish to comply with a social distancing order
against the wishes of their employer. Similarly, one can imagine
businesses closing in compliance with instructions, but workers seeking
other work for need of income. Government needs mechanisms to
encourage compliance with a social distancing order. Though governments
should retain the legal power to enforce closures if absolutely necessary, it
would be preferable to subsidize lost profits and incomes as necessary. The
latter approach was used extensively in countries affected by SARS for
people placed in quarantine.
220
Practical constraints prevent some countries from being able to enact this
solution. Many countries have more pressing needs than addressing a
potential pandemic. Furthermore, some countries may be unable to provide
compensation for closure. In 1918, each wave of the pandemic lasted for
220. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM
SARS 139 (2003), available at http://www.louisville.edu/medschool/ibhpl/images/pdf/
SARS%20REPORT.pdf.
[59:1
2007] PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: ETHICS, LAW, AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH 167
several months, and most locations were hit by multiple waves.22' The
amount of resources needed to compensate for lost income or profits for
this amount of time may be well out of the reach of many of the world's
governments.
In light of these constraints, governments should, at the very least, weigh
seriously the risks to health and welfare from workplace closures and other
social distancing measures against the preventive effects on disease
transmission. For each country, the balance of risks may be resolved
differently, depending on the country's resources and financial situation of
the population. Countries should consider tactical closures if necessary.
Perhaps only those entities that most facilitate transmission should be
closed. Schools have been identified as a primary driver of seasonal
influenza2 22 and are also believed to be a substantial factor during
pandemics. Countries might also consider using closures as a means to buy
time for other preparations. Finally, closures could be implemented until
the level of disease in a community exceeds a predetermined level and then
relaxed, with the hope of slowing the initial spread of disease through the
community.
3. Provision of Necessities
If people are instructed to avoid public places or if those places are
required to close, there will be a need for people to procure food, medicine,
and other necessities. Similarly, stoppage of mass transit may prevent
people from being able to access facilities that remain open, and it may
prevent some people from being able to seek medical care. There is a
distributive justice concern relevant to all of these issues-namely, those
with the least resources are least likely to be able to procure additional
resources before closures occur. They are also the least likely to have
private transportation available to seek medical care. Thus, they are both
less likely to be able to receive care and more likely to have to remain in
homes with infectious people.
Ideally, governments would set up networks for the distribution of
necessary provisions to citizens' homes. Distribution would be conducted
in a manner that takes into account ease of access in particular
communities. It would be consistent and reliable and provide necessities
such as food and medicine for the duration of social distancing measures.
It should also be conducted in such a manner that minimizes interaction
with potentially infectious people and infection control precautions should
be employed to decrease the likelihood that supply distributors will vector
disease. Transportation for medical care should be provided as needed by
221. Johnson & Mueller, supra note 163, at 107.
222. See Ferguson et al., supra note 117; Germann et al., supra note 30.
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personnel who are apprised of the risks involved and provided with
appropriate personal protective equipment. Similarly, a program should be
put in place for the removal of bodies from homes in a safe and efficient
manner.
Resource constraints and logistical difficulties are likely to impede such
a program in many areas. Many governments may lack the resources to
provide food, medicine, and other necessities to its citizens during a
pandemic. Even if the resources are available, the workforce needed to
conduct distribution may be absent, especially at the height of a pandemic.
Furthermore, there may be a lack of people who want to interact closely
with potentially infectious people to allow such a system to function. This
may be especially true for medical transport and mortuary services.
At the least, governments should try to facilitate the provision of
resources before areas are affected by disease. To the extent possible,
governments should give advance warning of disease and make
recommendations about how much food, medicine, and other supplies
should be stockpiled. If possible, governments should provide these for
people unable to afford their necessities. Governments should provide
access to medical care to the greatest extent possible and assign public
safety officers for this purpose. Governments also should provide a means
by which people who have recovered from influenza (and are therefore
immune), could assist others in the provision of necessities.
J International Travel and Border Controls
Transnational public health law is increasingly important in global
health, as evidenced by the WHO's International Health Regulations and
national agencies' proposed communicable disease regulations. 2 3 These
legal initiatives reflect recommendations for border controls by the
WHO.224 Transnational containment measures can include entry or exit
screening, reporting, health alert notices, collection and dissemination of
passenger information, travel advisories or restrictions, and physical
examination or management of sick or exposed individuals. These kinds of
powers were exercised in Asia and North America during the SARS
outbreaks, although their effectiveness is not established.225 The IHR also
223. HHS., Quarantine, Inspection, Licensing Rule, 42 C.F.R. §§ 70-71 (2005).
224. WHO, WHO SARS RISK ASSESSMENT AND PREPAREDNESS FRAMEWORK (Oct.
2004), available at http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/
CDS CSRARO 2004_2.pdf; INST. OF MED., QUARANTINE STATIONS AT PORTS OF ENTRY:
PROTECTING THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH (2005).
225. See David M. Bell & World Health Organization Working Group on Prevention of
International and Community Transmission of SARS, Public Health Interventions and
SARS Spread, 2003, 10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1900 (2004); Ronald K. St. John et
al., Border Screening for SARS, 11 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 6 (2005).
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authorizes sanitary measures at frontiers or on conveyances, such as
inspection, fumigation, disinfection, pest extermination, and destruction of
infected or contaminated animals or goods. 226
1. Economic Impact of International Travel and Border Controls
Sovereign nations seek to safeguard their citizens' health from external
threats, even in a global world where people, animals, and goods rapidly
travel across state boundaries. Although border protection is legitimate, it
can severely disrupt travel, trade, and tourism. The World Trade
Organization (WTO) defends free commerce but permits science-based
trade restrictions to protect the public's health. 7  As with trade
restrictions, protection of the public's health needs to be balanced against
the global economic impact of any travel restrictions or border control
policies. Closure of borders will have an enormous global economic
impact. World travel and tourism account for about 10% of global GDP
and 8% of global jobs, generating more than $4 trillion in economic
activity and over 200 million jobs in 2005.228 During the SARS outbreaks,
tourism in Asia dropped 30% to 80% for various countries in the region.
After travel bans were put in place, almost half the planned international
flights to Southeast Asia were cancelled. Even Australia saw a 20%
decline in international arrivals. Even if countries will not officially close
their borders during an influenza pandemic, voluntary social distancing
would disrupt trade, transport, and travel.229 In fact, studies suggest that
European travel bookings have already diminished due to H5N 1 fears. 30
Given thie sensitivity of economic disruptions of trade and travel during a
pandemic, international coordination of border control policies is essential
to avoid misunderstanding and promote cooperation. While the economic
impact of a pandemic will be considerable for both developed and
developing countries, the long-term consequences will be harder to
overcome for the latter. Industrialized countries should be aware of this
when making decisions with transnational impact. Governments should
only take those measures that are necessary to address the actual risk to the
community. Travel and border control measures should be implemented in
a non-discriminatory fashion, and only when the harms caused by the
intervention are proportionate to the benefits.
226. See Revision of the International Health Regulations, supra note 168; see also 42
C.F.R. §§ 70-71.
227. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 172, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001).




2. Governmental Transparency and Coordination
Given the transboundary nature of travel advisories as well as the
economic impact they can have on affected countries, it should be left to
the WHO to issue transparent and clearly justified travel recommendations
in accordance with the revised IHR. Individual countries should
communicate all relevant information on the emergence of a public health
threat to the international community. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of
the national government to use any policy instruments available to ensure
compliance with the requirements of the new IHR. Reporting and
surveillance responsibilities may be beyond the capacity of developing
countries. The industrialized countries should show solidarity and be open
in the way they carry out health protection responsibilities.
Fear of infection and uncertainty about the risk and virulence of the virus
can have a negative impact on the global economy. Reactive and
uncoordinated national actions to close borders or embargo trade could fuel
unfounded fears in the early days of a pandemic, similar to the early stages
of the SARS epidemic when public fears were amplified by concerns that
some governments were withholding information about the disease. To
avoid unwarranted travel disruptions and economic burdens governments
have the responsibility to honestly disclose credible scientific information
as early as possible.
3. Civil Liberties
International travel and border control also can infringe upon civil
liberties. The freedom of movement is a basic right protected by national
laws and international treaties, but it is subject to limits when necessary for
the public's health.231 In particular, these strategies can present serious
privacy risks. For example, containment measures may require the travel
industry to collect and disclose passenger data.232 Privacy burdens are
justified only if necessary to obtain high-quality surveillance data and in
accordance with fair information practices. To avoid discrimination and to
ensure proportionality, public health officials should inform the affected
individuals about the reasons for the infringement, the intended use of the
information and the extent of third parties access to the data.
231. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); General Comment, Human Rights
Comm., Continuity of Obligations Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21 (1999).
232. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, "Regulatory Impact Analysis of Proposed
42 C.F.R. Part 70 and 42 C.F.R. Part 71," available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/nprm/
docs/draftria_final.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
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K. Isolation and Quarantine
The terms "quarantine" and "isolation" often are used interchangeably,
but they are, in fact, distinct. The modem definition of quarantine is the
restriction of the activities of asymptomatic persons who have been
exposed to a communicable disease, during or immediately prior to the
period of communicability, to prevent disease transmission.233 In contrast,
isolation is the separation, for the period of communicability, of known
infected persons in such places and under such conditions as to prevent or
limit the transmission of the infectious agent.234 Quarantine and isolation
can be accomplished by various means, including having the person stay in
his or her home, restricting travel out of an affected area, or having the
individual stay at a designated facility.235 Whatever techniques are used, it
is important to treat symptomatic, potentially exposed, and non-exposed
populations differently. It would be inappropriate to place infected
individuals in the same room as those who are only potentially exposed.
Isolation and quarantine were used widely in Asia and Canada during the
SARS outbreaks in 2003.236 In Toronto, between 13,000 people237 and
30,000 people 23 were quarantined. In Beijing and Taiwan those numbers
were even higher-specifically, 30,000 people in Beijing and 131,000
people in Taiwan were quarantined.239 While quarantine and isolation
played a major role in the containment of SARS, they will be less
appropriate as containment measures during a pandemic influenza. Unlike
SARS, influenza's transmission characteristics allow little time for
isolation and quarantine.
233. See id. at 541-43 (describing two forms of quarantine: absolute and modified); see
also Daniel S. Reich, Modernizing Local Responses to Public Health Emergencies:
Bioterrorism, Epidemics, and the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, 19 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 379, 406-07 (2002) [hereinafter Modernizing Local
Responses]; Revision of the International Health Regulations, supra note 168 (defining
quarantine as "the restriction of activities and/or separation from others of suspect persons
who are not ill ... in such a manner as to prevent the possible spread of infection or
contamination").
234. See CONTROL OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASES MANUAL 539-40 (Abram S. Benenson
ed., 16th ed. 1995) (describing six forms of isolation: strict, contact, respiratory,
tuberculosis, enteric precautions, drainage/secretion precautions); see also Marguerite M.
Jackson & Patricia Lynch, Isolation Practices: A Historical Perspective, 13 AM. J.
INFECTION CONTROL 21 (1985).
235. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Flu Pandemic Mitigation: Quarantine and Isolation,
available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/hsc-scen-3-flu-pandemic-
quarantine.htm. (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
236. See Gostin et al., supra note 116.
237. Jane Speakman, Quarantine in Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome and Other
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 63 (2003).
238. Id. at 5.
239. Id.
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Whatever their effectiveness, quarantine and isolation are the most
complex, not to mention legally and ethically controversial, of the public
health powers. Quarantine and isolation represent the tension between the
interests of society in protecting and promoting the health of its citizens
and the individual's rights of privacy, non-discrimination, freedom of
movement, and freedom from arbitrary detention.240  The legitimacy of
such coercive public health powers rests on a careful balancing of these
competing interests,241 with the public benefit outweighing the burden
quarantine may place on individual rights. Additionally, each country
should comply with the internationally agreed upon Siracusa principles,
which hold that restrictions of liberty should be legal, proportionate,
necessary, and according to the least restrictive means that are reasonably
available.242
1. Legal Authority
Clearly defined jurisdictional boundaries and limits on governmental
power are necessary to create public accountability. Statutory criteria
should incorporate rigorous scientific measures of risk and allow
quarantine only when necessary for the public's health. Governments
should use coercive health measures only when a disease is known through
extensive scientific study to be contagious. Moreover, governments should
limit application of the measures to those actually exposed to the disease.243
Occasionally, resource and time constraints will justify immediate
government action without prior medical testing of each individual. In
addition, the availability of accurate tests and competent medical staff can
be limited. However, to ensure the legitimacy of such measures, public
health authorities should fully and honestly disclose their reasons for action
and allow community participation in such decisions. Transparency will
enhance public trust and acceptance of the proposed containment
measures. 244
2. Due Process (Natural Justice)
In addition to substantive protections, judicial procedures-specified in
terms of the process, rather than the outcome-are necessary to ensure the
legitimate use of isolation and quarantine. Ideally, quarantine and isolation
240. Id. at 3.
241. Id. at 4.
242. See Siracusa Principles, supra note 139.
243. See Modernizing Local Responses, supra note 233.
244. Daniel Markovitz, Quarantines and Distributive Justice, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
323, 323 (2005); DAVID HEYMAN, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT'L STUD., MODEL
OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR DISEASE ExPosuRE CONTROL 16-17 (2005), available at
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/051102_dec-guidelines.pdf.
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would affect only those that are actually infected with H5N1. However,
such infallibility is unlikely. Therefore, governments should design
judicial procedures that reach toward the more feasible goal of protecting
the public health while minimizing human rights violations and ethical
concerns.
Of particular concern is the protection of groups of people-especially
minority populations-from the inappropriate use of state power.
Regardless of a country's judicial system and infrastructure, governments
should avoid restrictions on individual movement that are arbitrary,
unreasonable, or discriminatory. Isolation or quarantine orders should last
no longer than scientific review justifies. Public health officials should
publicly explain their decisions and re-evaluate any orders on a regular
basis. Moreover, countries should have procedural mechanisms for groups
to challenge the unjustified use of quarantine or isolation power.
As important as individual due process rights are, the urgency of a
pandemic outbreak might preclude individual hearings. Many countries do
not possess the judicial infrastructure to cope with the volume of hearings
that would result from a mass quarantine, particularly since the high
morbidity and mortality associated with a highly pathogenic influenza
pandemic would strain the already existing infrastructure. However,
developing countries with strong judicial infrastructures should maintain
individualized due process to the extent feasible.
3. Monitoring and Enforcement: Voluntary or Least Intrusive Means
Quarantine and isolation should be voluntary whenever possible. When
mandatory containment is necessary, governments should first apply the
least restrictive measures followed, when necessary, by a graded
application of more restrictive measures.245 For example, while Canadians
generally complied voluntarily with quarantine requests during the SARS
outbreak, 246 public health officials elsewhere-including China, Hong
Kong, and Singapore-had to use more coercive measures. In Hong Kong,
barricades and tape were used to confine infected residents in a large
housing complex. 247 In Singapore, three telephone calls were made per day
245. WHO Pandemic Influenza Draft Protocol for Rapid Response and Containment, at
11-12 (Jan. 27, 2006), available at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avianinfluenza/
guidelines/RapidResponse_27%2001 .pdf.
246. UNIV. OF TORONTO JOINT CTR. FOR BIOETHICS, PANDEMIC INFLUENZA WORKING
GROUP, STAND ON GUARD FOR THEE: ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PREPAREDNESS PLANNING
FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 13 (2005), available at http://www.utoronto.ca/jcb/home/
documents/pandemic.pdf.
247. Nola M. Ries, Public Health Law and Ethics: Lessons from SARS and Quarantine,
13 HEALTH L. REV. 1, 3 (2001), available at http://www.law.ualberta.ca/centres/hli/pdfs/13-
01/13-1-01_Ries.pdf.
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to the home of each quarantined individual to confirm compliance.248
Surveillance cameras were placed in homes where people were
quarantined, and inhabitants were required to take their own temperatures
on camera to avoid fraud.249 Electronic wrist or ankle-bands also were used
as enforcement measures.
25°
Different countries have different norms and needs, and one must view
different enforcement measures in the context of what a given society
considers to be reasonable. At a minimum, the monitoring and
enforcement measures adopted should have a logical and proportionate
relationship to the achievement of the public health objective and should be
implemented in a fair and non-discriminatory manner. Finally, all
measures taken should be culturally accepted and collectively approved by
the populace.25'
4. Ensuring Safe, Humane Implementation of Isolation or Quarantine
When quarantine and isolation are necessary, the principle of reciprocity
obliges society to provide those affected with the necessities of life during
the period of quarantine, including safe and humane housing, as well as
high quality medical care and psychological support. Recent studies have
confirmed that quarantine imposes serious financial and psychological
hardships on affected individuals: about 30% of quarantined individuals
suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder and depression.252 All countries
should be required to provide and pay for these basic needs. Furthermore,
quarantine needs to be implemented in a humane manner that is sensitive to
gender, religious, and ethnic issues.
Distributive justice requires that officials limit the extent to which the
personal and economic burdens of a public health threat fall unfairly upon
individual citizens. To this end, governments and national and
international organizations should stockpile medical supplies and food in
an effort to fairly and equitably address any lack of resources and
amenities. A pandemic influenza will require solidarity among nations and
collaborative approaches that set aside traditional values of self-interest and
territoriality.
248. ROTHESTEIN ET AL., supra note 220, at 25.
249. See id.; see also Ries, supra note 247, at 3.
250. See ROTHESTEIN ET AL., supra note 220, at 25.
251. Id.
252. See, e.g., Laura Hawryluck et al., SARS Control and Psychological Effects of
Quarantine, Toronto, Canada, 10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 7 (2004) (recording
incidences of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) among individuals quarantined during
the Canadian SARS outbreak).
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CONCLUSION
Preparing for an influenza pandemic presents difficult challenges, many
of which transcend mere scientific effectiveness. Even when successful,
coercive public health interventions can have deep, adverse consequences
for economic and civil liberties. Therefore, it is vital that individual rights
are sacrificed only when necessary to protect the public health. As such,
laws must clearly establish the criteria for the exercise of such emergency
powers and provide adequate due process to minimize infringements on
individual rights.
The threat of an influenza pandemic is real and could affect millions of
lives. If such a disaster occurs, we must not allow the widespread erosion
of individual rights to compound the tragedy. We must form an immediate
political and social response to the effect coercive public health measures
will have on civil liberties. Only then are we equipped-ethically as well
as scientifically-to deal with the impact of a global pandemic.
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